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When the Wall has Fallen: Decades of Failure in the 
Supervision of Capital Juries 
JOSE FELIPE ANDERSON· 
- Surely, when the wall has fallen, will it not be said to you, 'Where 
is the mortar with which you plastered it. ' 
Ezekiel l 
• Director of the Stephen L. Snyder Center for Litigation Skills, Director of Litigation Skills 
Programs and Associate Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. J.D., University of 
Maryland School of Law; B.A., University of Maryland, Baltimore County. 
This article is dedicated to four giants of the law who took the time to personally touch my life. 
Professor Leroy Clark who, as a visiting Professor at the University of Maryland while I was a student, 
served as a great inspiration to me. His example made me believe in the great potential to change the world 
through teaching law. His contribution to the work of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund during the pre-
Furman death penalty years of the fund should also never be forgotten. I would also like to thank Professor 
Norman Amaker, Professor Clark's colleague at the Fund, who, like other lawyers there, endlessly chased 
, death warrants around the country saving those subjected to an arbitrary death penalty. Sadly, he passed 
away in June of 2000, before I could share this article with him. Professor Amaker, who did not know me, 
took the time to read a draft of my first article on capital punishment and urged me not to be afraid to "say 
where I stood" on crucial points. His efforts contributed greatly to that article and my scholarship today. 
Furthermore, Professor Derrick Bell provided advice about achieving tenure by urging me to write often 
to develop the discipline to complete my projects. And finally to the late Judge A. Leon Higginbotham 
who just took the time to talk to me about me, my family, my work and our collective future as a human 
race. His example shines for me as it does for countless others. He always made you feel like you were the 
most important person in the room. 
Any merit in this article is due to the contribution of these great men, any errors are mine alone. 
Apologies for the length of this acknowledgment, but the scripture cautions that we should "withhold not 
good from them to whom it is due, when' it is in the power of thine hand to do it." Proverbs 3:27 (King 
James). I gratefully acknowledge the contribution of Matthew Green, my research assistant, and Gloria Joy, 
my administrative assistant, for their efforts on this project. Furthermore, I thank the University of 
Baltimore Foundation for the research grant which supported this project. 
1. Ezekiel 13:12 (New King James). 
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o 
- "A capital sentencingjury is made up of individuals placed in a very 
unfamiliar situation and called on to make a very difficult and 
uncomfortable choice." 
Iustice Thurgood Marsha1l2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the return of capital punishment after Furman v. Georgi~ nearly 
three decades ago, the Supreme Court of the United States has struggled to 
control the administration of capital punishment when those decisions are 
made4 or recommended by a citizen jury. S Although there is no constitutional 
requirement that a jury participate in the death penalty process,6 most states 
do provide, through their capital punishment statutes, that a jury will 
participate in the decision.7 The preference for jury sentencing in these 
circumstances reflects a reluctance to leave power over life solely in the hands 
of one judge.8 Still, some scholars have long criticized juries for 
administering punishment.9 . 
Of particular concern to the Supreme Court has been the problem of jury 
discretion in capital cases. Finding ways to control the deliberations of the 
capital jury to prevent them from rendering decisions which are as arbitrary 
as being "struck by lighting"IO has been the primary focus of the Supreme 
Court at least since the early 1970's. If one considers the plurality opinion in 
Furman as a great wall erected to prevent continued movement toward 
implementation of arbitrary and capricious death sentences, II the public 
2. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 333 (1985). 
3. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
4. Generally, when judges engage in sentencing they have broad discretion in detennining what 
they consider when passing sentence. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 244-45 (1949). 
5. In some states, the jury makes a recommendation to the sentencing judge as to whether death 
is appropriate. See, e.g., FJ..A. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (West 1996). 
6. See Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504,515 (1995) (explaining that there is no constitutional 
requirement that a sentencing hearing in a capital case be conducted by a jury). 
7. See Katheryn K. Russell, The Constitutionality of Jury Override in Alabama Death Penalty 
Cases, 46 ALA. L. REv. 5, 9 (1994) ("Two-thirds of the states with capital statutes and the federal 
government accord the jury final sentencing power."). 
8. See Duncan v. Louisiana. 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968). 
9. See Charles Kerr, A Needed Reform in Criminal Procedure, 6 Ky. L.J. 107, 108 (1918) 
(explaining that unlike judges, juries lack experience in assessing sentencing considerations). 
10. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309-10 (1972) (Stewart. J., concurring). 
11. The former Governor of Ohio, Michac;1 V. DiSalle, once commented: 
[T]hequestion of who should be put to death in the name of the law and who should live is 
often decided by men influenced more by public climate and public clamor than by abstract 
justice. He who is to die is too frequently a man who has committed a crime at the wrong 
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movement which followed to reinstate capital punishment affected the mortar 
with which the wall was erected. 12 The jurisprudence that followed the calls 
for control over the arbitrary behavior ofthe capital jury has wavered in recent 
years from the commitment to place controls over the death penalty, and to 
insure it is a true last resort for the worst of the worst. 13 
The rise in crime that occurred during the early seventiesl4 combined 
with the political rhetoric that emerged from partisan politics made the 
Supreme Court and the death penalty fair game for controversy. IS A shift in 
the political climatel6 along with a change in the leadershipl1 and the 
personnel of the Supreme Court made the fragile wall of protection erected in 
Furman increasingly vulnerable to attack. IS Shifts in the Supreme Court 
majority have led to grave concerns about the fairness of capital punishment 
in the decades following Furman. 19 With aggressive state action to pass new 
death penalty statutes in order to resume executions, inevitably the Court has 
become less protective of the values advanced in the Furman opinions.2O 
time in the wrong place [and] under the wrong circumstances. A different combination of 
the same factors could well produce a more temperate verdict. 
MICHAEL V. DISAU.E. nre PoWER OF LIFE OR DEATH 4 (1%5). 
12. See generally Ezekiel. supra note 1. at 13:12. 
13. The idea that capital punishment is reserved for the worst of the worst seems to have always been 
a part of the discussion of which circumstances justify a death penalty. The Supreme Court decisions 
attempting to regulate the death penalty have failed to limit the class of eligible defendants or to fairly 
administer the punishment among them. "For better or worse, the Supreme Court of the United States has 
launched this country on a large and risky experiment, testing whether our most severe-and the only 
irreversible-penalty can be applied in ways that meetreasonable standards offaimess." JAMESQ. Wn.soN, 
THINKING ABOUT CRIME 194 (l9S3). 
14. The rise in crime during the end of the Warren Court likely contributed to the public sentiment 
for retaining capitaI punishment. See EARL WARREN, nreMEMOIRSOFEARL WARREN 316·17 (1977). 
15. See generally EDWARD J. VAN AU£N, OUR HANDCUFFED PoUCE: THE AssAULT UPON LAw 
AND ORDER IN AMERICA AND WHA TCAN BE DoNE ABOUT IT 13·29 (1968) (suggesting that courts during 
the Warren years aided criminals at the risk of the safety of citizens). 
16. The Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Earl Warren, revolutionized criminal justice by 
obligating the states to comply with the commands of the federal Bill of Rights concerning the rights of the 
accused. See generally ROBERT G. MCCLoSKEY, nre MODERN SUPREME COURT 322-66 (1972). 
17. See DAVID G. SAVAGE, ThRNiNG RIGHT: nre MAKING OF TIlE REHNQUIST SUPREME COURT 4 
(1992) (discussing the conservative tendencies of the Burger Supreme Court). 
IS. Furman v. Georgia, 40S U.S. 238, 306·10 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
19. The appointment of Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court by President George Bush on 
October 18, 1991 assured that the conservative turn of the Rehnquist Court would continue. Justice Thomas 
has demonstrated little willingness to recognize the claims of capital defendants before the Court. See 
Christopher E. Smith, The Constitution and Criminal Punishment: The Emerging Vision of Justices Scalia 
and Thomas. 43 DRAKEL. REv. 593. 595. 603 (1995) (discussing the jurisprudence of Justice Thomas on 
capital punishment issues). 
20. The only two justices to repeatedly conclude that the death penalty is cruel and unusual were 
Justices Thurgood Marshall and William Brennan; they are no longer on the Court. See, e.g., Wilson v. 
744 OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26 
One of the primary casualties of the post-Furman decline in 
constitutional protection advances in the form of various controls on juries 
that decide capital cases. Decisions during the 1980' s regarding what a capital 
jury may consider,2t what they may not hear,22 and what type of statutory 
instructions and forms must guide them23 demonstrated some promise that 
Furman concerns would, at times, be seriously regulated. 24 However, over the 
last several decades the Court has issued opinions which indicate that it is 
more concerned with state autonomy in administering the death penalty than 
the defendant focused concerns of Furman.25 
In my view, instructions to the capital jury are the primary vehicle of 
procedural protection against unjust imposition of the death penalty.26 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has approached its capital punishment 
jurisprudence without due regard to the scientific research that is available 
regarding how consideration of death sentences is different from other jury 
decisions.27 This article is an attempt to discuss what went wrong with the 
Supreme Court's jurisprudence regulating capital juries and proposes some 
solutions that direct how the Court might increase scrutiny of jury instructions 
when reaching life and death decisions.28 
Zant, 110 S. Ct.1170 (1990) (Brennan and Marshall, J1., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
21. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 594-609 (1978) (discussing mitigating factors). 
22. See Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 509 (1987) (holding that victim impact statements 
introduced at sentencing violates the Eighth Amendment). 
23. See Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 384 (1988) (holding that the judge's instructions 
concerning the verdict form may have precluded the jury from considering mitigating evidence, thus the 
Court would not risk upholding a sentence of dell/.h). 
24. "[C]hanneling and limiting of the sentencer's discretion in imposing the death penalty is a 
fundamental constitutional requirement for sufficiently minimizing the risk of who\1y arbitrary and 
capricious action." Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 362 (1988). 
25 .. Traditiona\1y, capital punishment has been administered at the state level through a variety of 
sentencing schemes. 
26. The Supreme Court has said that the popularity of jury trial provisions in capital cases reflects 
that society has a "reluctance to entrust plenary powers over the life and liberty of the citizen to one judge 
or to a group of judges." Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968). 
27. Some scholars have gone so far as to suggest that death is so different from a\1 other penalties 
that due process requires that while considering the punishment, the law should recognize a presumption 
in favor of a life sentence. See Beth S. Brinkman, The Presumption of life: A Starting Point for a Due 
Process Analysis of Capital Sentencing. 94 YAlE LJ. 351, 352-53 (1984). 
28. "The many studies showing that juries do not understand standard instructions very well are ... 
[a] cause for concern. When poorly instructed juries are being asked to decide the fate of a fellow human 
being, that concern becomes an issue of constitutional magnitude." Peter Meijes Tiersma, Dictionaries and 
Death: Do Capital Jurors Understand Mitigation?, 1995 UTAH L. REv. 1,49. 
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n. THE ORIGINS OF GUIDED DISCRETION 
To understand how capital juries should be guided in their discretion it 
is useful to examine how capital punishment was administered and controlled 
prior to the due process revolution which preceded the Furman decision.29 
"America's entry into World War I led to the restoration of the death penalty 
in a number of states. ,,30 Most of those executions occurred in the southern 
United States. In fact, "of the fourteen states, each of which performed over 
100 executions between 1930 and 1969, ten were Southern. Those Southern 
states together accounted for 1,901 executions: approximately half of the 
3,859 total for all the United States in that period."3. 
A lack of fairness in the South was linked to the problem of racial 
discrimination,32 and consequently the death penalty was linked to statistics 
which represented staggering disparities between treatment based on the 
simple equation of black versus white.33 For example, "[o]fthe 455 persons 
executed for rape between 1930 and 1969, 443 or 97.4 percent were executed 
in the South. Moreover, of those executed 398, or 90 percent, were black. In 
the South, eleven men were executed for burglary, all of whom were 
black .... [T]wenty-three men were executed for armed robbery, nineteen of 
whom were black." 34 
Compounding the problems of racial disparity in executions was the 
unofficial system of executions known as "lynching" which was prominent in 
the American South.3S Lynching was the height of an arbitrary system of 
imposing death and was the means by which mobs imposed punishment when 
they became too angry or too impatient to wait for the traditional justice 
system to work.36 Noted Historian Lawrence Freeman describes the lynching 
process in this way: ., 
[T]he mob decided that honor demanded direct action-the honor of 
the white woman, her family, and the community. The lynching was 
29. See SAVAGE, supra note 17, at 80-88. 
30. FRANKLIN E. Z1MRING & GoRDON HAWKINS, CAPITAL PuNISHMENT AND TIlE AMERICAN 
AGENDA 28 (1986). 
31. Id. at 30-31. 
32. See M. Dwayne Smith, Patterns of Racial Discrimination in Assessment of the Death Penalty: 
An Assessment of Louisiana, 1987 J. CRIM. JuST. 15. 
33. See generally A. LEoN H1GGINBO'IlIAM, JR., IN TIlE MATIER OF COLOR RACE AND TIlE 
AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS: THE COLONtAL PERIOD (1978) (examining the historical roots of such 
disparity). 
34. ZIMRlNG, supra note 30, at 31. 
35. See generally ERIC FoNER, REcONSTRUcnON: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 454-55 
(1988) (explaining the Enforcement Acts and the Ku Klux Klan Act which embodied Congress' response 
to racial violence after the Civil War). 
36. See LAWRENCE M. FlUEoMAN, CRIME AND PuNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 189 (1993). 
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part of an "unwritten code." Southerners distrusted the state, and 
preferred, in these cases, "personal justice." They "believed strongly 
that community justice included both statutory law and lynch law"; 
indeed, lynch law "was perceived as a legitimate extension of the 
formal legal system.'>37 
Some scholars have also noted that the brutal system of punishment was 
not totally without explanation. "A brutal logic underlay the violence. As a 
rule, lynchings were not spontaneous acts against convenient blacks. Whites 
almost always believed that mobs punished real transgressions and that the 
lust for vengeance played a prominent role in lynching."38 In the system of 
lynch law was the origin of the very arbitrariness of which the Furman 
decision would become concerned with years later.39 "Moreover, the simple 
truth that lynching, as a form of punishment, was susceptible to the personal 
whims of each lyncher ensured that the jurisdiction of the lynch mob was both 
expansive and capricious.'>40 
Not only was the arbitrariness of the lynch mob part of its operational 
dynamic, but the victim based elements that became part of the lynching 
process 41 injected an additional freakish factor into the equation that affects 
capital sentences even today. That is, the risk of arbitrary death sentences 
based on the race of the victim, and the unforeseen consequences on the 
family resulting from the crime against the victim. 42 During the lynch law 
system, these factors affected the decision to impose "death by mob" to a 
frightening peak. 
By avenging the murder of a white man, a mob also avenged the 
desecration of the ideal of the patriarchal family. The lynching of the 
black murderer became a bloody drama in which the white 
community assumed the protection of the widow and the fatherless 
family while at the same time it affirmed the tragic future and 
vulnerability the family faced.43 
37. Id. at 190. 
38. W. FnzHUGH BRUNDAGE, LYNCHING IN TIlE NEW SOUTH 49 (1993). 
39. Concerns over racial discrimination in lynching and in rape prosecutions became the backdrop 
for many of the concerns expressed in Furman. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 2~2 (1972) (Douglas, 
J., concurring) (noting that discriminatory enforcement of the death penalty renders it unconstitutional). 
40. BRUNDAGE, supra note 38, at 49. 
41. See generally BRUNDAGE, supra note 38, at 49-85 (describing characteristics and statistics of 
those involved with lynching, including how they were carried out, for what reasons, and against whom). 
42. See Elizabeth Anna Meek, Note, Victim Impact Evidence and Capital Sentencing: A Casenote 
on Payne v. Tennessee, 52 LA. L. REv. 1299, 1310 (I 992)(UEven ifit was relevant in a particular case, by 
its nature ... [victim impact] evidence is unduly prejudiciaI."). 
43. BRUNDAGE, supra note 38, at 74. 
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Ironically, understandable sadness for surviving victims became the driving 
force behind the lynch mobs who may not be inclined to act out their racial 
prejudice alone. 
Interestingly, when the few whites who were lynched for sensational 
crimes were determined to be eligible for the punishment that was primarily 
reserved for blacks,44 it was the result of concern for the victims since "[t]he 
mobs that lynched whites were comprised typically of family, friends and 
neighbors of the victim[.],04s This system varied only slightly from that in 
Europe during the twelfth century where it was the accusers responsibility to 
bring action against the perpetrator.46 Lynching took its lead from some 
ancient societies that "left [it] to the families of the dead person to exact a 
price for the wrong that had been done to them[. ]'047 
Even luminaries like the great Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. recognized 
that some families may seek revenge as a matter of personal privilege if not 
legal right. 48 Justice Holmes once commented that "people would gratify the 
passion of revenge outside of the law, if the law did not help them, the law has 
no choice but to satisfy the craving itself[.r049 Although the instinct for 
revenge may be explainable, attempts to mete out punishment while 
considering it with combinations of other factors is itself a controversial 
proposition. so 
The revenge based system of lynch law brought attention to the general 
condition of the justice system for African Americans. Perhaps the most 
famous of all early capital cases involving African Americans began with 
Powell v. Alabama,S) which became known as the famous Scottsboro Boys 
cases. 52 These decisions provided the right to counsel in capital cases so that 
the accused could have the "guiding hand of counsel at every step in the 
proceedings against him ... 53 A few other Supreme Court cases followed 
which provided more protection for the criminally accused. In Patton v. 
Mississippi racial discrimination in jury selection was prohibited. 54 It was 
44. See id. at 86. 
45. See id. at 91. 
46. See generally BoWARD PEmRs, TORTURE 41 (1985). 
47. MICHAEL KRONEWETTER, CAPITAL PUNIsHMENT: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 34 (1993). 
48. See generally OUVER WENDElL HOLMES, JR., 1HE COMMON LAw 39-44 (Uttle, Brown & Co. 
1949) (1881). 
49. [d. at 4t. 
50. See FRANK G. CARRlNGrON, NEI11IER CRuaNoR UNUSUAL 18 (1978) (explaining that "society 
has not only the right, but the affirmative duty, to exact the supreme penalty from foul and vicious killers"). 
51. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
52. See generally JAMES GooDMAN, STORIES OF SCOTISBORO (1994) (giving a detailed account of 
the case and its sUlTOunding controversy). 
53. Powell, 287 U.S. at 69. 
54. 332 U.S. 463, 468-69 (1947). 
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followed by Fikes v. Alabama, which provided protection against coerced 
confessions. 55 Shortly thereafter, the Court decided Hamilton v. Alabama56 
which developed their earlier decision in Powell by recognizing that many 
cases in the South where rights were violated often "involved the rights of 
black defendants in southern trial courtS[.]"57 
During the 1960' s, the plight of African American criminal defendants, 
particularly those potentially subject to capital punishment, was placed 
squarely in the hands of the lawyers at the NAACP Legal Defense and 
Educational Fund.58 The Fund implemented what became known as its 
moratorium strategy. 59 Toward the end of the 1960' s, social science research 
began to come to bear on the capital punishment process. Research done in 
Maxwell v. Bishop6IJ presented a powerful statistical analysis by Professor 
Marvin Wolfgang that indicated racial discrimination against black 
defendants, particularly in rape prosecutions.61 
That same year the capital jury itself was studied in Witherspoon v. 
lllinois,62 where the Court considered the defendant's claim that excluding 
persons from the jury with general religious objections against the death 
penalty was improper unless the prospective juror made it unmistakably clear 
that his views would prevent him from considering a death sentence no matter 
what the evidence adduced.63 The practice of excluding such jurors was 
common in many states. The evidence presented to the Court consisted of 
surveys suggesting that jurors who favored capital punishment were more 
likely to convict than those who were opposed to the penalty.64 The Court 
held that it violated the Constitution to attempt to obtain a "hung jury,,6S by 
55. 352 U.S. 191, 197-98 (1957). 
56. 368 U.S. 52 (1961). 
57. WILLIAM J. BOWERS, LEGAL HOMICIDE: DEA m AS PuNISHMENT IN AMERICA 1864-1982, at 16 
(1984). 
58. The NAACP Legal Defense Fund has long been involved in the struggle against the death 
penalty and other issues involving unequal treatment of African Americans. See generally JACK 
GREENBERG, RACE RELATIONS AND AMERICAN LAw 34-39 (1959) (explaining the purpose and objectives 
of the Fund). 
59. See MICHEAL MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT 107 (1973)(detailing the legal strategy of the NAACPIawyers in obtaining a halt to executions 
by the early 1970's). 
60. 398 U.S. 262 (1970). 
61. 257 F. Supp. 710, 717-21 (E.D. Ark. 1966). 
62. 391 U.S. 510 (1968). 
63. [d. at 513-18. 
64. See id. at 517 n.l0. 
65. The risk of a jury so closed-minded that they would quickly impose death has always been a 
concern of jury scholars. The importance of a unanimous jury as a protection against this problem has 
recently been thoughtfully discussed. See Kim Taylor-Thompson, Empty Votes in Jury Deliberations, 113 
HARv. L. REV. 1261 (2000) (discussing the dangers of non-unanimous verdicts on jury decisionmaking). 
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automatically excluding jurors who expressed some reservations against the 
death penalty.66 
In 1971, the Supreme Court was challenged with the question of whether 
ajury without any standards at all could impose a death penalty in McGautha 
v. California.67 In a six to three vote the Supreme Court held that due process 
did not require that a jury be required to follow established standards and 
guidelines in considering a death sentence.68 Justice Harlan wrote that to 
establish guidelines for imposing death before the fact "appear to be tasks 
which are beyond present human ability."69 One scholar insightfully noted 
that Justice Harlan's rationale disclosed "a fatal flaw, a kind of reductio ad 
absurdum in the death penalty itself[.],,70 
Soon, lower courts began to respond to the logic of arguments by death 
penalty advocates who criticized the standardless and often discriminatory 
punishment. 71 As the new decade began, California, with what was then the 
largest death row population in the country, held that its death penalty was per 
se unconstitutional.72 With a new decade dawning it appeared that capital 
punishment was under severe attack, primarily because of concerns that juries 
comprised of ordinary citizens could not be trusted to administer it fairly.73 
ill. THE PROMISE, POWER, AND PROBLEMS OF THE AMERICAN JURY 
In order to understand the risk of failing to properly guide jury discretion 
in a capital case, it is useful to examine the traditional role of the jury in 
American law. From its inception the jury has been recognized for its 
66. See Witherspoon, 391 u.s. at 522-23. 
67. 402 U.S. 183, 185 (1971). 
68. See id. at 196. 
69. Id. at 204. 
70. Harry Kalven, Jr., Forward: Even When a Nation Is at War, 85 HARV. L. REv. 3, 25 (1971). 
71. See, e.g., People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880 (Cal. 1972). 
72. See id. at 899. 
73. A few years before the capital punishment moratorium that preceded Furman, many believed 
that capital punishment may well be abolished in America. At that time, one former governor commented: 
The retentionists will not give up without a struggle. The police lobby, the sensational 
press, the office holders who consider success at the polls more important than solving 
human problems, the public prosecutors who look upon convictions merely as rungs on the 
ladder to higher political rewards-all are still fighting. It seems to be a losing battle. 
It is gratifying to know that the last barbaric relics of the Middle Ages are beginning 
to recede into their own darkness; that in our own time we may expect to see the twilight of 
hopelessness transformed into the dawn of hope; that the time may not be far off when we 
can say to those who have stumbled in the shadows, Night need not fall. 
DISAlLE, supra note II, at 214. 
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advantages and criticized for its disadvantages. There is no institution 
developed by manki~d more controversial than the American jury system.74 
Juries consist of ordinary citizens called on any given day, in any state, and in 
federal or county courthouses to resolve disputes of all kinds between people 
or entities.7s Their responsibilities range from deciding whether a human 
being should be destroyed for criminal conduct'6 to deciding petty squabbles 
between neighbors.77 Without warning a carpenter, fisherman, or salesman 
could be sitting in judgment for a multi-national corporation or a homeless 
vagrant.7S Possibly, some persons will never serve on a jury while others may 
serve several times, but the range of potential jurors has raised the question of 
why ordinary citizens should judge such important matters without training or 
experience.79 A multitude of concerns have been raised over whether juries 
are even capable of understanding the instructions on the law they are 
routinely given.so 
74. Complaints about the jury system have long been documented. See U>sTER BERNHARDT 
ORFIELD. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREsT TO APPEAL 408-13 (1947). 
75. See United States ex rei. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 18-19 (1955)(discussing the merits of 
"plain people" deciding cases). 
The criminal trial jury has been described as the "palladium of liberty" and the "conscience 
of the community." For that conscience to operate in a way in which we, as a society, can 
be proud, we must be confident that the community is in fact a conscientious one. 
Unfortunately juries, like all elements of a complex society, may occasionally give us cause 
to question this assumption. 
Clay S. Conrad, Scapegoating the Jury, 7 CORNEU.J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 7,8 (1997) . 
. 76. Juror participation in the death penalty partly replaces the outlawed feud and vendetta, "men and 
women are supposed to refrain from talcing vengeance on their enemies no matter what the provocation and 
instead tum to the law for justice and satisfaction." LOIS O. FORER, A RAGE TO PuNISH 97 (1994). 
77. At an earlier time in my legal career I was counsel in a three day jury trial that involved a fist 
fight between feuding neighbors that began over, among other things, a parking dispute. The loser of the 
fist fight sought civil damages in his lawsuit. I represented the winner of the fight who had already been 
convicted of simple assault in criminal court and received a minimal sentence that did not involve 
incarceration. After a short deliberation, the jury found that the defendant had committed the assault but 
awarded no damages. 
The trial judge. a veteran of many decades of jury trials, had urged the plaintiffs to accept our settlement 
offer in chambers before jury selection, stating "I see these cases all the time and the jury is going to give 
you about one dollar. They do not like to lose time from work or their families to give money to neighbors 
who cannot get along even if they are clear who started the fight." Interviews with members of the jury after 
the verdict confirmed the judge's comments in chambers. 
78. The broad range of people serving on juries is designed to place in "the jury room qualities of 
human nature and varieties of human experience." Peters v. Kiff,407 U.S. 493, 503 (1972). 
79. See generally John H. Langbein, Mixed Court and Jury Court: Could the Continental 
Alternative Fill the American Need?, AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 195 (1981) (exploring the strengths and 
weaknesses of European models using professional jurors). 
80. There has been a longstanding debate about whether the untrained laymen should determine the 
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Certainly, there are other ways to resolve disputes rather than submitting 
them to amateur ·~udges." Using combat,81 strange ordeals,82 and other 
mystical fonns of proof have all been tried and have failed the test of time.83 
However, our current system of jury trials has been criticized as bearing too 
much resemblance to trials by combat, with lawyers using "scorched earth" 
tactics in a win at all costs approach.84 Such tactics before juries has shaken 
confidence in the jury system 8S These problems, combined with the long-
standing skepticism about lawyers,86 have encouraged reformers to examine 
outcome of a criminal case. "[A]t the heart of the dispute have been express or implicit assertions that the 
juries are incapable of adequately understanding evidence or determining issues offact ... [any] better than 
a roll of dice." Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157 (1968). 
81. See generally IAN DOUGLAS WDLOCK, THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF TIlE JURY IN 
SCOTI.AND 3-105 (1966) (detailing the developments of the jury trial in Scotland and Great Britain). 
82. See generally id. 
Once our world was enchanted. In this place arose an understanding of criminal procedure 
which permitted proofs such as throwing an accused into a pool of blessed water or having 
him pluck an object from a boiling cauldron. Clergy read the signs. The man whose body 
was received by the water or whose would heal within a specified period of time was proved 
innocent. In 1215 the Fourth Lateran Council forbade clergy from performing the sacred 
acts that attended the ordeals. In time, this form of proof died. In its place the judicially 
centered inquisitorial system arose in Gennany, Italy, France, and the Iay-centered jury 
system in England. 
Trisha Olson, Of Enchantment: The Passing of the Ordeals and the Rise of the Jury Trial, 50 SYRACUSE 
L. REv. 109, 110-11 (2000). 
83. See generally WUJ..OCK, supra note 81, at 3-105. 
84. Lawyers have often been criticized for their lack of integrity by members of the general public 
because of their willingness to obtain financial gain. See generally Kenneth Lasson, Lawyering Askew: 
Excesses in the Pursuit of Fees and Justice, 74 B.U. L. REv. 723 (1994) (evaluating the negative 
perceptions society has of lawyers and ways that image could be changed). 
85. A flamboyant attorney once wrote, "an impartial jury is a myth. Each side in a (jury] trial wants 
jurors it believes will be sympathetic to it, so lawyers deliberately set out to select specific jurors." 
WIlJ..IAM M. KUNS'\1ER & SHED..A ISENBERG, My LIFE AS A RADICAL LAWYER 287 (1994). 
86. As one observer documented several decades ago: 
The most comprehensive American poll of the public's attitude toward lawyers was 
undertaken in 1960 by the Missouri Bar .... Most of the public and the lawyers themselves 
believed contingent fees in personal injury cases were much too high. Many of the 
complaints about lawyers overcharging came from people in the Kansas City area where the 
prevailing contingent fee in the personal injury cases is SO percent. Most people thought 25 
percent or less would be fair. Nearly 57 percent of the people who used lawyers thought 
lawyers created lawsuits unnecessarily, [and] ... they didn't make enough effort to settle 
cases as they should. 
MURRAY TEIGH BLOOM, THE TROUBLE Wrm LAWYERS 332-33 (1968). "It's those flamboyant personal 
injury lawyers who really besmirch the profession, starchy big-firm lawyers grumble. They swoop down 
on disasters like vultures, sometimes even disguising their runners as Red Cross workers or priests to sign 
up clients." DAVID W. MARS1'ON, MAUCE AFORETHOUGHT: How LA WYERS USE OUR SECRET RULES TO 
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the jury trial as a decision making tool. 
Despite its detractors, many believe that the jury is the linchpin of our 
democracy, indicating our commitment to a decentralized process through 
citizen participation.87 Although praised for its democratic character, it is 
often ostracized for its unpredictable and sometimes freakish results, some 
judges going so far as to say that juries are getting "dumber."88 Many 
countries have largely dispensed with it,89 and other countries like Great 
Britain where the jury trial was born, while not eliminating it, have drastically 
altered the control lawyers have in selecting those who will serve.90 
Recently, lawyers have been going to great expense to develop 
techniques they believe will lead them to predict what a jury is likely to do 
when it deliberates a case.91 The use of professional jury consultants has 
become a typical tool in high profile jury cases.92 By incorporating science 
and psychology, advocates have explored ways to shape jury decisions rather 
than merely selecting impartialjurors.93 Such techniques have relied in large 
GET RICH, GET SEX, GET EVEN '" AND GET AWAvWrrn tr35 (1991). 
87. One writer credits James Madison with reporting that the right to a jury trial was among "the 
most valuable" rights included in the Bill of Rights. ROBERT AU£N RU1LAND, THE BIRllI OF TIlE Bn 
OF RIGHTS 1776-1791, at 208 (2nd ed., Northeastern Univ. Press 1991) (1955) (quoting I ANNALS OF 
CONGo 755 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789». 
88. HAROLD J. ROTHW AX, Gun. TV: THE COUAPSE OF CRlMlNAL JusnCE 200 (1996). 
89. See id. at 220-21. 
90. See, e.g., Raymond 1. Broderick, Why Peremptory Challenge Should Be Abolished, 651'EMP. 
L. REv. 369, 371-74 (1992). Peremptory challenges should be abolished in order to assure "that no citizen, 
on the basis of invidious discrimination, will ever be excluded from participating in this most important 
responsibility of citize~hip[.l" Id. at 422. 
91. Many studies have revealed that "background characteristics of jurors such as race, sex, and age, 
among others, have been associated with certain verdict preferences." JEFFREY T. FREDERICK, THE 
PsYCHOLOGY OF TIlE AMERICAN JURY 15 (1987). 
92. Jury consultants typically take one of four approaches to categorize jurors: 
The Typologists argue that people can be categorized into various personality types 
that are meaningfully related to verdict preferences .... 
The Clinicians also rely on psychological principles and systems to rate individual 
jurors on their verdict preferences .... 
The Empiricist rely on statistical assumptions and methods to determine which kinds 
of people will hold a particular verdict preference .... 
The Theoreticians use psychological principles and empirical research methods to 
study each case. 
Robert D. Minick, Using Jury Consultants to Assist Voir Dire, in PRAcnCING LAW lNS1TIVfE, FiFnI 
ANNUAL unGA nON MANAGEMENT SUPERCOURSE 294-96 (1994). 
93. See Jos~ Felip~ Anderson, Catch Me ijYou Can! Resolving the Ethical Tragedies in the Brave 
New World of Jury Selection, 32 NEW ENG. L. REv. 343, 384 (1998). See also JEFFERY ABRAMSON, WE, 
nm JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND TIlE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY 176 (1994). "Scientific jury selection grew 
out of, and in turn pushed further. the prevailing skepticism about juries as impartial institutions of justice." 
Id. 
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part on racial and gender stereotyping in an attempt to predict likely decisions 
in particular cases.94 The Supreme Court has complicated this area of the law 
making it unclear whether jury selection consultants are in any way prohibited 
from helping lawyers select juries by using race and gender based 
demographic data.9s 
On the more practical side, many observers have been concerned about 
the lack of interest citizens have sometimes demonstrated in their willingness 
to serve onjuries.96 Many people go to great lengths to avoid doing their civic 
duty, and others make excuses to avoid participation. 97 Some trial judges 
have even ordered incarceration for those who have been reluctant to report 
when called to serve.98 Such behavior has been attributed to a lack of respect 
for the importance of the jury as an institution.99 Others say it is a result of 
how we have treated jurors over the years. For example, some studies have 
indicated that serving is a financial hardship because of the low wage that is 
offered.1°O Problems have also been attributed to the unpredictable length of 
94. "[T]he effect of racial composition on a jury and its verdict is most noticeable when the trial 
involves a blatantly racial issue." HIROSHI FliKURAl ET AL., RACE AND 1HE JURY: RACIAL 
DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND TIlE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE 5 (1993). 
95. Demographic perspectives playa major role in the jury selection process. The role that these 
attitudes play is reflected in the comments of one prosecutor's observations about jury selection: 
Some believe that members of the venire with a Nordic background are highly practical, 
Mediterraneans are thought to be emotional, elderly people are considered more forgiving, 
and social workers ... [have] a real or imagined predisposition to rehabilitation rather than 
punishment. . .. Along these lines, some people have theorized that African Americans 
may not be good prospective jurors in a capital case because they have historically been 
persecuted as a race and would therefore sympathize with the prosecuted defendant. In 
addition, some believe that many blacks have probably been the victims of, or observed, 
rough treatment in their neighborhoods by the police and that accordingly they would resent 
police officers regardless of the merits of the case. 
Ronald 1. Sievert, Capilal Murder: A Prosecutor's Personal Observations on the Prosecution o/Capital 
Cases, 27 AM. 1. CRIM. L. 105, 110 (1999). 
96. Only about 45 percent of Americans who are sent jury notices actually appear at the courthouse. 
See S'ffiPHEN J. ADLER, nm JURY: TRIAL AND ERROR IN 1HE AMERICAN COURTROOM 220 (1994). 
97. Unfortunately, many people view jury service with disdain and put it "in a class with measles 
and root canal work. Quite often, intelligent, successful people who would make good jurors are the ones 
who get out of serving." F.I...EEBAILEY & HARVEY ARONSON, nm DEFENSE NEVER RESTs 257 (1971). 
98. A few judges have imposed incarceration for persons who have avoided jury duty. See Dennis 
O'Brien, Two No-Shows for Jury Duty Have Day in Court, BALT. SUN, June 26, 1998, at 38. 
99. See BAILEY & ARONSON, supra note 97, at 257. 
100. Most states only pay a modest amount per day for jurors who serve. One recent report has 
supported that employees should compensate jurors during their term of service. See MARYLANDCOUNCn. 
ON JURY USE AND MANAGEMENT: REPORT AND REcoMMENDATIONS 3 (Apr. 2000) [hereinafter MARYLAND 
JURY REFORM REPORT). 
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service depending on the circumstances of the trial. 101 Lack of participation 
has even attributed it to the process of strange rules and control which limit 
jurors from talking about the case during the trial,102 and the rules that keep 
large parts of the trial a mystery to them.103 With so many controversies, 
suggestions that we should abandon its use in the United States recur; 
consequently, some modifications are obviously needed, but examining which 
reforms make the most sense requires some restraint in proposing change. 104 
IV. THE MODEL PENAL CODE AND CONTROL OF JURY DISCRETION 
In an effort to control juries in the death penalty process from making 
arbitrary decisions, the American Law Institute (ALI) made several proposals 
at its May, 1959, meeting in the form of tentative drafts on the subject of 
capital punishment. lOS The ALI took no position on the appropriateness of the 
death penalty; 106 instead, it recognized that "the death penalty ranked high 
among issues of public controversy in the criminal law.,,107 The drafters 
explained: 
[Tlhe Reporters favored abolition of the capital sanction. The 
Advisory Committee recommended by a vote of 17-3 that the Institute 
express itself upon the issue .... The Council was divided on the 
issue of retention or abolition but substantially united in the 'view that 
the Institute could not be influential in its resolution and therefore 
should not take a position either way. 108 
The drafters believed that "[ilt was clear ... that many jurisdictions 
would retain the sentence of death for some forms of murder for many 
years[.)"I09 Thus, it was essential that the ALI address at least two essential 
problems. IIO "[F]irst, in what cases should capital punishment be possible; 
and second, what agency and what procedure should determine whether the 
101. Proposals for one-day/one-trial systems have been implemented with some success as a way to 
encourage citizen participation. See Developments in the Law-The Civil Jury, 110 HARV. L. REv. 1408, 
1455-56 (1997). 
102. See MARYLAND JURY REFORM REPoRT, supra note 100, at 8. 
103. See Anderson, supra note 93, at 397. 
104. For a discussion of major proposed reforms to the jury system, see Akhil Reed Amar, 
Reinventing Juries: Ten Suggested Refonns, 28 V.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1169, 1176-94 (1995). 
105. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 note on history of section (1980). 
106. See id. 
107. Id. at cmt. 1. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
llO. See id. 
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sentence of death should be imposed."1J1 
The wisdom in the ALI's judgment on this point cannot be overstated. 
Because of the philosophical differences that abound regarding capital 
punishment,1I2 the legal processes by which it might be imposed are varied. 
The need for some guiding model to assist those jurisdictions that might elect 
capital punishment was obviously essential. Particularly. in a legal and 
structural, rather than a political or emotional, perspective. I \3 In order to make 
it clear that the attempt to develop a suitable decision making framework for 
capital decisions would not be misunderstood. the ALI emphasized its 
cautionary tone: "[i]t bears repeating, however, that inclusion of this provision 
in the Model Code does not signal Institute endorsement of capital 
punishment, nor does the optional authorization of this penalty under the 
statute reflect an Institute· decision in favor of abolition." 114 
An influential study prepared for the ALI by Professor Thorsten Sellin, 
determining that "executions have no discernible effect on homicide death 
rates [,],,1 15 was also considered by the Model Penal Code drafters. Subsequent 
research also supported this conclusion,116 while other more controversial 
research attempted to demonstrate the possibility of a deterrent effect. 117 The 
efficiency of the death penalty as a deterrent, however, was clearly a 
secondary concern for the ALI. The drafters pointed out that, "[a] trial where 
life is at stake becomes inevitably a morbid and sensational affair, fraught 
with risk that public sympathy will be aroused for the defendant without 
reference to guilt or innocence of the crime charged. ,,118 • 
Seeking a structural resolution of how best to approach the problem of 
drafting a death penalty statute, the drafters observed that "it is obvious that 
capital punishment is the most difficult of sanctions to administer with even 
rough equality. A rigid legislative definition of capital murders has proved 
Ill. MODELPENALCODE§210.6cmt 1 (1980). 
112. See generally THE DEA11I PENALTY IN AMERICA: CURRENT CONTROVERSIES (Hugo Adam 
Bedau ed., 1997) (discussing capital punishment philosophies). 
113. Capital punishment bas often been related to the emotionally charged image of American 
politiCians who like to maintain that they are tough on crime. 'There is an overwhelming desire for 
Americans to demonstrate that they are very tough people. The death penalty is a symbolic demonstration 
of toughness." IANGRAY&MOIRASTANlEY,APUNIsHMBNTINSEAROIOFACJuME: AMERICANS SPEAK 
OUT AGAINSTTIIB DEA11I PENALTY 299 (1989). 
114. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 cmt.! (1980). 
115. Id. at cmt. 2 (quoting T. SEUlN, THEDEA11I PENALTY 34 (1959». 
116. For a discussion concerning of the efficacy of the death penalty as a deterrent, see Richard O. 
Lempert, Desert Il1Id Deterrence: All AssessmeTlt of the Moral Bases of the Case for Capital PunishmeTlt, 
79 MIOI. L. REv. 1177 (1981). • 
117. See generally Isaac Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life 
Il1Id Death, 65 AM. EcON. REv. 397 (1975). 
118. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 cmt. 2 (1980). 
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unworkable in practice, given the infinite variety of homicides and possible 
mitigating factors." I 19 Focusing on the most critical concern of any decision 
making system, the control of discretion, the drafters explained that because 
of the nature of how the death penalty is imposed "[a] discretionary system. 
. . becomes inevitable, with equally inevitable differences in judgment 
depending on the individuals involved and other accidents of time and place. 
Yet most dramatically when life is at stake, equality is, as it is generally felt 
to be, a most important element of justice."12o Recognizing that the penalty 
would continue to be sought in many states, the drafters advised that "[t]hose 
jurisdictions that elect to retain the penalty must confront the special need to 
provide a fair and rational system of administration and to meet recently 
developed constitutional standards."121 
The ALI totally rejected any notion that the death penalty should be 
imposed for any crime other than murder. 122 The exclusion of non-homicide 
crimes was primarily motivated by the unequal exercise of discretion in rape 
prosecutions toward Blacks, which was considered by the ALI to be 
"distinctly unsettling.,,123 The disparity of Black executions for rape which 
reflected a disparity of 366 out of 409 total executions was considered "too 
suggestive to ignore[.],,124 The exclusion of all crimes except murder reflects 
the continuing theme of seeking controlled discretion in capital cases. 
"Discretion always includes the possibility of abuse, and discretion that is 
neither disciplined nor informed by intelligible standards is all the more likely 
• to be exercised on unacceptable bases.,,125 
V. THE 1970's: REFLECTION AND RETRENCHME.NT, FURMAN, GREGG, AND 
LoCKEIT 
In Furman v. Georgia,126 the Supreme Court found that all existing 
punishment schemes violated the Eighth Amendment. While Furman did not 
hold that the death penalty was per se unconstitutional, it did recognize that 
the penalty was "differ[ent] from all other forms of criminal punishment, not 
in degree but in kind. ,,127 The Supreme Court opinion in Furman produced a 




122. See id. at cmt. 3. 
123. Id. 
124. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 cmt. 3 (1980). 
125. Id. at cmt. 4. 
126. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
127. Id. at 306 (Stewart, 1., concurring). 
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for how it was then being applied around the country. 128 The principle theme 
that achieved a consensus with the Court was that even if the punishment 
could be constitutionally applied, it should not be applied in a manner that is 
unguided, standardless, inconsistent, or unfair. 129 
Furman was a surprising opinion considering that McGautha, decided 
one year earlier,I30 gave little foreshadowing that such a sweeping opinion 
would come from the Court. It may be that the debate generated in the 
discussions in both opinions are the clearest explanation of why the Court has 
had such a struggle determining which controls over jury discretion are 
necessary and which are not. 131 Courts had always been comfortable granting 
judges broad sentencing discretion,I32 but guiding juries through the mysteries 
of deliberations was no doubt a difficult challenge to comprehend and from 
which to fashion a jurisprudence. 133 
The greatest value of Furman was that it represented a clear 
contemplation and reflection by the Supreme Court to consider a complete 
structural change in its jurisprudence. Like it had done almost two decades 
before in Brown v. Board of Education 134 and a decade earlier in Gideon v. 
Wainwright,I3S the Court took on the responsibility to begin the process of 
supervising a constitutional system that had demonstrated obvious and 
longstanding flaws. 136 After Furman, the Court had a four year break from 
issuing opinions in capital cases while the states rushed to replace their 
invalidated death penalty schemes. 137 
The states struck back when they began prosecuting death penalty cases 
under new statutes they believed were constitutionally acceptable. 138 Many 
128. Id. at 240-374. 
129. See id. 
130. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971). 
131. After Furman was decided there was much speculation about what type of statute would meet 
constitutional standards. 
132. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 24445 (1949) (recognizing that sentencing judges 
have broad discretion as to the types and sources of information they can consider). 
133. See, e.g., Kordenbrock v. Scroggy, 919 F.2d 109I,II09-IO(6thCir.l990)(vacatingasentence 
because substantial possibility existed that the jury was misled by lack of instruction regarding mitigating 
factors). 
134. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
135. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
136. Both Brown and Gideon were followed by major undertalcings at the state level which brought 
about structural changes in the way the legal system operated. 
137. See infra note 139 (many states renewed the penalty). 
138. One commentator has suggested that the Furman decision may have encouraged the States to 
advance new death penalty statutes. 
The Supreme Court told them in the Furman decision that perhaps there were classes of 
cases for which the supreme penalty might be exacted provided that the standards for the 
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were based on the Model Penal Code fonnulation developed in the late 
1950'S.139 Among those statutes was the one developed by the State of 
Georgia that was reviewed by the Supreme Court in Gregg v. Georgia. 140 
Gregg was the first in a trilogy of cases decided on the same day which 
upheld state death penalty sentencing schemes. The other cases were Proffitt 
v. Floridal41 and Jurek v. Texas,142 which also upheld death penalty statutes 
in their respective states. 143 In Gregg, the Supreme Court said that "where 
discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the 
determination of whether a human life should be taken or spared, that 
discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of 
wholly arbitrary and capricious action. ,,144 
The Supreme Court held that the Georgia capital punishment statute was 
not unconstitutional because. among other things, it provided adequate 
procedural safeguards to prevent the jury from considering issues in a manner 
that was unfairly prejudicial to the accused. 145 The Court pointed out that 
"bifurcation"l46 of the capital sentencing hearing was the primary safeguard 
needed to prevent the jury from misusing the information they had been 
given. 147 Bifurcation prevents particularly prejudicial information from being 
death sentence were carefully drawn and the penalty was not applied in an arbitrary and 
discriminatory manner. The legislators responded .... They sought to classify certain acts 
as justifying capital punishment. 
fRANK O. CARRINGTON, NEITHER CRUEL NOR UNUSUAL 31 (1978). 
139. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (1980). 
140. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
141. 428 U.S. 242 (1976). 
142. 428 U.S. 262 (1976). 
143. Id. at 276; Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 259-60. 
144. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189 (opinion of Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens) .. 
145. See id. at 206-07. 
146. The concept of bifurcation has been favored in directing the discretion of the jury in complex 
cases. Its practical effect is to separate the legal and factual issues in the case so that the jury does not 
become confused or prejudiced against the capital defendant before making appropriate decisions. 
In bifurcated trials, only the evidence and testimony relevant to each segment [of the trial] 
is presented to the jury for its decision before moving forward to the next segment, if 
necessary .... Empirical studies suggest that the use of bifurcated trials ... can improve 
overall juror comprehension or provide a practical roadmap for jurors during their 
deliberations .... 
Paula L. Hannaford et al., How Judges View Civil Juries, 48 DEPAUL L. REv. 247, 259-60 (1998). 
147. It is not an accident that the instructions to jurors are sometimes vague, incomplete, and 
difficult to understand. In fact, there is a clicbt that jurors frequently set aside these 
instructions and decide the case on the merits according to the dictates of their consciences 
and not according to written statutory law. 
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heard. 148 The potential to have the jury make a guilty determination of a 
defendant after hearing infonnation relevant to sentencing was consistent with 
the approach advanced by the ALI in the Model Penal Code drafts. 149 The use 
of a bifurcated procedure ultimately became considered among the most 
important tools for guiding discretion. ISO For example, to permit the jury to 
hear about the defendant's criminal background would deny him the fair trial 
to which he was entitled. "Given the gravity of the decision to be made at the 
penalty phase, the State is not relieved of the obligation to observe 
fundamental constitutional guarantees."ISI 
The procedural protection offered in Gregg was designed to prevent the 
death penalty from becoming "wanton[]." "freakish[]" and as arbitrary as 
being "struck by lightening. "IS2 The Supreme Court has cautioned that any 
decision to impose the death penalty should be based on reason rather than 
emotion or caprice. 153 Separating the death penalty trial into two phases 
emphasized the notion that juries need to be controlled regarding particularly 
inflammatory information. Although it may be that most people consider the 
guilt/innocence determination to be the most important finding, the penalty 
phase is entitled to constitutionally mandated procedural protection. 
"[F]undamental principles of procedural fairness apply with no less force at 
the penalty phase of a ... capital case than they do in the guilt-determining 
phase of any criminal trial. "154 
Gregg also directed that capital punishment statutes should list 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances to direct the sentencing juries 
discretion. ISS The defendant would not be subject to the death penalty unless 
the jury found that he met one of the aggravating circumstances. l56 The jury 
would then balance the aggravating circumstances against the mitigating 
circumstances in order to determine whether death or some other sentence 
Josepb B. Kadane. Sausages and the lAw: Juror Decisions in the Much Larger Justice System. in INSIDE 
nm JUROR: nm PsYCHOLOGY OF JURY DECISION MAKING 229 (Reid Hastie ed .• 1986). 
148. Potentially prejudicial materiallike·victim impact information is an example of evidence that 
may inflame the passion of a sentencing jury. See Joan M. Shaughnessy. Booth v. Maryland. Insight into 
the Contemporary Challenges to Judging. 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 279. 285 (1992) (noting that courts 
are utterly unequipped to manage the "uses and dangers of emotion in judging"). . 
149. MODEl. PENAL CODE § 210.6 cmt. 2 (1980). 
150. See Hannaford. supra note 147. at 259-60. 
151. Estelle v. Smith. 451 U.S. 454.463 (1981). 
152. Furman v. Georgia. 408 U.S. 238. 309-10 (1972) (Stewart. 1.. concurring). 
153. See Gardner v. Florida. 430 U.S. 349. 358 (1977). 
154. Presnell v. Georgia. 439 U.S. 14. 16 (1978). 
155. Gregg v. Georgia. 428 U.S. 153.193-95 (1976). . 
156. See id. The Supreme Coun bas ruled that a jury need not be required to specify particular 
aggravating factors that permit a death sentence. See Hildwin v. Florida. 490 U.S. 638. 640-41 (1989). 
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would be appropriate. 157 This process would take place after the jury found 
the defendant guilty of the given murder charge beyond a reasonable doubt. 158 
At the sentencing phase, however, the burdens of proof for weighing and 
balancing need not be established beyond a reasonable doubt in order to 
uphold a capital sentence. 159 
It was also required that state death sentences be subject to automatic 
state appellate review. l60 The reason for this requirement is obvious. Without 
the possibility that the discretion of the jury be subject to automatic appeal, 
it would be easy to revert to a system of summary justice that prevailed in 
many states. 161 Gregg set the framework for how death penalty cases would 
be prosecuted and defended for decades to come; furthermore, attacks on 
death verdicts would be framed in the context of the aggravation/mitigation 
categories,162 and challenges to evidence, 163 jury instructions,l64 and conduct 
of counsel165 would be forever linked to its structure. 
Later in the decade the Court issued another pro-defendant ruling in 
Lockett v. Ohio,l66 where a state statute that did not permit giving independent 
157. Some scholars suggest that requiring juries to balance at all is an insunnountable task. ''The 
sentencing authority's attention may be guided and channelled, but its discretion remains unguided and 
uncontrolled if aggravating and mitigating circumstances are present." ZlMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 
30, at 87. 
158. The tenn "reasonable doubt" has been described as an "almost heroic commitment to decency," 
which sometimes permits the guilty to go free. See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANs ZEIsEL, nre AMERICAN 
JURY 189 (1966). 
159. Some writers have suggested that "'capital punishment may be imposed only when the guilt of 
the person charged is based upon clear and convincing evidence leaving no room for an altemative 
explanation of the facts ... ' ROGER HOOD, nre DEATII PENALTY: A WORLD WIDE PERSPECTIVE 67 (1989). 
160. See generally Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862,874-80 (1983). 
161. A recent report calculated that currently the national average of the time it takes from the initial 
trial to execution in capital cases is about 10.6 years. See JAMESS. L1EBMANET AL., A BROKEN SY5"reM: 
ERROR RATES IN CAPITAL CASES, 1973-1995, at 3 (2000) (cited in Fox Butterfield, Death Sentences Being 
Overturned in 203 Appeals, N.Y. TIMEs, June 12,2000, at AI. 
162. The essence of mitigation is the notion that "[ e]xcept, possibly, in the rarest kind of capital case, 
a capital defendant could never be sentenced to death solely on the basis of the crime committed." WELSH 
S. WHITE, THE DEA TIl PENALTY IN TIlE NINETIES 7 (1991). 
163. Capital litigation involves a constant effort to "object to inadmissible evidence proffered by the 
prosecutor." AMERICAN BAR .AssOCIATION, AMERICAN BAR AssOCIATION GUIDELINES FOR TIlE 
APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL IN DEA TIl PENALTY CASES 135 (1989). 
164. See Harris v. Wood, 64 F.3d 1432, 1438 (9th Cir. 1995) (making multiple challenges to the 
death sentence, including prejudicial jury instructions). 
165. Cf. Lawson v. Dixon, 3 F.3d 743, 755 (4th Cir. 1993) (exhibiting how prosecutors appeal to 
jurors by stating that, "in other countries, after being convicted of first-degree murder, authorities would 
bring a rope and hang the defendant summarily[.]" and this was not reversible error). 
166. 438 U.S. 586 (1978). 
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consideration to mitigating factors was considered unconstitutional. 167 Lockett 
opened the door to the use of a wide variety of information about the 
defendant's background and history in order to urge a jury not to render a 
death sentence. 168 In the opinion, the Court made clear that structural 
limitations on the consideration of mitigating evidence would be disfavored. 169 
Indeed, as the decade ended the Court reinforced its ruling in Lockett with its 
decision in Green v. Georgia,170 where it was held that exclusion of reliable 
hearsay evidence of mitigation relevant to punishment from the penalty phase 
of a trial violated due process. 171 The scope of the Green opinion ushered in 
an era of social science and social background testimony rarely known to jury 
trials in other types of cases. 172 
As the 1970's concluded, there was something for both death penalty 
opponents and advocates. The punishment had been halted for a time, and 
where it was reinstated new statutes greatly restricted its use, making it more 
difficult to pursue because of a host of new and unfamiliar procedural rules. 173 
For the death penalty proponent, the availability of the punishment itself had 
retained its popularity and returned with a vengeance, given the sanction of 
the Gregg trilogy and its guidelines to follow in drafting constitutional 
statutes. 174 
167. The requirement that death be imposed only on a person who has been considered 
as an individual, in all her uniqueness, reached its zenith in Lockett v. Ohio. Lockett 
recognized the Eighth Amendment right of a capital defendant to have the decisionmaker 
hear individualized circumstances of the defendant's life and crime that might provide a 
reason to let her live. 
Joan W. Howarth, Deciding to Kill: Revealing the Gender in the Task Handed to Capital Jurors, 1994 
WIS. L. REv. 1345, 1367-68. 
168. Locken. 438 U.S. at 607-09. 
169. One commentator has described the Supreme Court's rulings on mitigating evidence in the years 
immediately after Lockett as striking down "any limitations on the kinds of mitigating evidence a defendant 
might present to the sentencerf.J" ROBERT A. BURT, DIE CONS1TI1J110N ON CONfUcr 338 (1992). 
170. 442 U.S. 95 (1979). 
171. Id. at 97. 
172. After Lockett it became a common practice to use social workers to present mitigation evidence. 
Other types of hearsay evidence was also sanctioned by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Jackson v. Herring, 
42 F.3d 1350, 1362-70 (lIth Cir. 1995) (discussing broad use of mitigating evidence in death penalty 
cases). 
173. Many creative legal challenges to death sentences came about as a result of the new Supreme 
Court decisions. See, e.g., Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1043-45 (9th Cir. 1995) (discussing use 
of multiple mitigation theories). 
174. After Furman, states drafted new death penalty statutes. '''These statutes have been subjected to 
critical scrutiny by many legal scholars, most of whom have concluded that they 'represent only a modest 
advance towards formality over the old pre-Furman statute(s).'" HOOD, supra note 159, at 153. 
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VI. THE 1980's: BEYONDMITIGATION,McCLESKEY, CAWWELL, AND MILLS 
With only a few years of experience and local precedent with the new 
state statutes, the 1980' s brought a host of new cases that helped to define the 
contours of the newly fashioned guided discretion statutes. The Court began 
the decade with three victories for defendants seeking to control jury power 
over death sentences. In Godfrey v. Georgia,175 the Court struck down the 
Georgia Supreme Court's interpretation of an aggravating factor describing 
a crime as "'outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, and inhuman'" as 
unconstitutionally vague. 176 
In Beck v. Alabama,177 the Court invalidated a statute that precluded the 
sentencing jury from considering lesser included offenses. 178 The Court 
observed that a statute imposing such limitations impermissibly skewed the 
fact finding process and thus violated constitutional standards.179 In 1981, the 
Court added the additional constitutional protection that double jeopardy 
prevented a death sentence to be the subject of retrial after a life sentence was 
received at the first trial. ISO 
In the celebrated Adams v. Texas case,181 the Court held that exclusion 
from a capital jury of those persons unable to swear that the possibility of the 
death penalty would not effect their verdict was unconstitutional. 182 Implicit 
in its decision was the recognition that the attitudes of individual jurors who 
might give a strong presumption that the death penalty is inappropriate in all 
but the strongest cases was worthy of protecting. 183 
Later in the decade, however, the Court retreated from the Adams holding 
in Wainwright v. Witt,184 when it determined that prospective jurors whose 
views on capital punishment would prevent or substantially impair the 
performance of their duty in a capital case could be excluded.185 The Court 
concluded that the jurors' views need not be established with unmistakable 
clarity, and the federal court accorded a presumption of correctness to the trial 
court's determination to exclude the juror for cause. 186 
175. 446 U.S. 420 (1980). 
176. ld. at 428-32. 
177. 447 U.S. 625 (1980). 
178. ld. at 644-46 
179. See id. at 642. 
180. See Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430,446 (1981). 
181. 448 U.S. 38 (1980). The Adams case became the subject of the book and movie, The Thin Blue 
Line. 
182. ld. at 40. 
183. See id. at 45. 
184. 469 U.S. 412 (1985). 
185. ld. at 424. 
186. See id. at 424, 426-29. For a discussion of jury system dismissal for cause, see J. Clark Kelso, 
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The Supreme Court has gone so far as to hold that a death sentence must 
be vacated if it is possible that the jury may have improperly delegated some 
of the responsibility for rendering the death sentence to another part of the 
criminal justice system. In Caldwell v. Mississippi,187 it was held that a 
prosecutor's argument that death penalty cases are reviewed by the State 
Supreme Court made their findings invalid. 188 The Court likely believed the 
jury would be unable to manage the information about the prospects of an 
appeal as they considered other information in Caldwell's case. The Court 
feared that the jury would be tempted to rely too heavily on the work of some 
other entity thereby diminishing their sense of responsibility for the outcome 
of the case.189 The rationale of Caldwell reflects the important concern that 
jurors, unfamiliar with the complicated death penalty process, should be 
protected from distractions that might lead them to render a death sentence too 
easily.l90 The prosecutor's argument encouraged their speculation about a 
future they could not possibly predict. . 
Later in the decade, the Supreme Court considered whether a jury should 
be permitted to issue a death decision without adequate guidance from the 
sentencing forms used by the state. In Mills v. Maryland, the Supreme Court 
held that the sentencing form used by the Maryland court confused the jury to 
such an extent that it was possible that an unintended death sentence could be 
rendered by using it. 191 The Court embraced the logic of the Maryland 
appellate court's dissenting judge who reasoned that under the form, if the 
jurors all thought the defendant's life should be spared but could not agree on 
a reason, a death sentence might be viewed as necessary because of the 
confusing form. 192 Mills was the first case that focused on the mechanics of 
Final Report of the Blue Ribbon Commission on Jury System Improvement. 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1433. 1480-
83 (1996). 
187. 472 U.S. 320 (1985). 
188. Id. at 325-26. 328-30. 
189. See id. at 325-26. 341. 
Psychological traits and attitudes may predict juror verdicts because jurors rely upon 
cognitive and emotional cues or assumptions to make decisions. To understand this process. 
one must understand the unique aspects of being a juror. For most people. participation on 
a jury requires them not only to process more information than usual, much of which may 
be unfamiliar. but also to make a decision that has serious consequences. 
Michael Owen Miller & Thomas A. Mauet, The Psychology of Jury Persuasion. 22 AM. J. TRIAL ADVoc. 
549.554 (1999). 
190. '''The tremendous importance of educating capital jurors on the nature of their task. as well as 
the constitutional nature of this mandate. would lead one to expect that in the death penalty area these 
studies on jury comprehension would fall on especially fertile soil." Tiersma. supra note 28. at 49. 
191. 486 U.S. 367. 382-84 (1988). 
192. See Mills v. State. 527 A.2d 3. 23 (Md. Ct. App. 1987). Judge McAuliffe stated: 
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a form used in a death penalty case. 193 It resulted in several death sentences 
being overturned in Maryland, and the institution of an emergency rule change 
to correct the form.l94 Focus on the actual tools of deliberation, like the 
verdict forms and work sheets, may ultimately become an important part of 
death penalty litigation. Since the forms are essentially of equal character as 
jury instructions, it is appropriate that they receive the same constitutional 
scrutiny.19s 
The petitioner is entitled to have his sentence set by a jury that is 
properly instructed. l96 There can be no presumption that the jury understood 
the charge-in a constitutional manner.197 When there "exists a reasonable 
possibility that the jury relied on an unconstitutional understanding of the law 
... that verdict must be set aside.,,198 Although Mills recognized that jury 
instructions and jury forms go together, its four dissenting justices expressed 
grave concerns about whether its protection might be short lived. l99 
Without a doubt the most important death penalty case of the decade was 
McCleskey v. Kemp, which held in a narrow 5-4 decision that Georgia's death 
penalty was not unconstitutionally discriminatory. 200 A holding in favor of 
McCleskey, in all likelihood, would have ended the death penalty in 
America.201 The issue in the case reflected the long standing controversy of 
[d. 
[I]t is probable, or at least reasonably possible, that __ . [the] jury understood the language 
... [as meaning] that the answers of "no" given on the sentencing form represented their 
failure to unanimously find the existence of a circumstance, rather than a unanimous 
determination that the circumstance did not exist .... [I]f I am correct, it means that the 
procedure followed in this case impermissibly and unconstitutionally precluded the ultimate 
consideration of mitigating factors that may have been proven. 
193. See Amy Goldstein & Paul Dugan, Supreme Coun Vinually Halts Death Penalty in Maryland, 
WASH. PoST, June 9, 1988, at DI. 
194. See id. 
195. "As the jury is being asked to apply ever more complex rules to complicated fact patterns, proper 
communication is increasingly essential. And nowhere is this more critical than when a person's life hangs 
in the balance." Tiersma, supra note 28, at 49. 
196. See Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343, 346-47 (1980). 
197. See id. 
198. Francis v. Franklin. 471 U.S. 307, 323 n.8 (1985). 
199. After Mills was decided. other states were effected by its holding. See, e.g., State v. McKoy. 
372 S.E.2d 12 (N.C. 1988) 
200. 481 U.S. 279, 308-13 (1987). 
201. The long history of racial discrimination in capital punishment strongly suggests that the only 
workable approach to the problem. if we acknowledge discrimination which cannot be removed, may be 
that entire punishment may need to be eliminated. 
One example of the structural racial inequality in the punishment is reflected in the policies of states 
like South Carolina prior to 1833, that provided no right toajury trial or appeal from a capital offense. See 
HIGGINBOTIiAM. supra note 33, at 180. 
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explaining why there is such a disproportionate racial impact. 202 That 
controversy is part of a recent and somewhat surprising trend to re-examine 
capital punishment in America.203 
Recently, the American Bar Association called for a moratorium on 
capital punishment.204 Early in 2000, the Republican Governor of lllinois 
issued a moratorium on executions in his state because of the disturbing 
finding that several persons on death row were innocent of the crimes for 
which they were charged.205 These facts came to light as a result of the 
availability of DNA evidence or revelations of police or prosecutorial 
discovery abuses.206 Efforts to prevent someone who is not the perpetrator of 
a crime from being executed is obviously a primary concern of a reliable 
justice system. Putting an innocent person to death does not aid the victims 
in their healing process, the jurors who render the verdict, or the public that 
still seems to strongly support capital punishment because on this point few 
would disagree.207 
The prospect of eliminating unexplained racial disparity, however, is a 
more challenging question. 208 The Supreme Court struggled with this question 
202. For an insightful examination of racial disparity on death row, see Stephen L. Carter, Comment, 
When Victims Happen to Be Black, 97 YALE L.J. 420, 439-43 (1988) (suggesting that jurors are influenced 
by both the race of the victim and the defendant in death penalty cases). 
203. Nebraska L.B. 76, which initially proposed abolition of the death penalty, was amended to 
propose a moratorium on the penalty until 2002, pending a study of all homicides in the state since 1973; 
however, the bill was unsuccessful. See H.R. 76, 96th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Neb. 1999). 
204. The organization "has officially called for a state-by-state moratorium on capital punishment 
until each adopts policies intended to 'ensure that death penalty cases are administered fairly and 
impartially, in accordance with due process, and ... minimize the risk that innocent persons may be 
executed. '" Craig 1. Albert, Challenging Deterrence: New Insights on Capital Punishment Deril!ed From 
Panel Data, 60 U. PITT. L REv. 321,323 (1999) (quoting ABA House of Delegates Recommendation of 
February 3, 1997 (visited Nov. 22, 1998) <http://www.socLniu.edul- critcrimldpldp-aba.». 
205. See Wendy Cole, Death Takes A Holiday; Illinois Halts Executions While Reviewing Mistakes, 
TIME, Feb. 14,2000, at 68 (discussing the death penalty moratorium decision ordered by Dlinois Governor 
George Ryan in light of 14 death row inmates being exonerated since 1987). 
206. Even one death penalty prosecutor has acknowledged that "[t]he once-evolving, and now 
(almost) unassailable, scientific technique of DNA profiling has served not only to convict many defendants 
but also to provide the defense bar with the most compelling evidence possible that a few defendants have 
in fact been wrongly convicted." Gwynn X. Kinsey, Jr., Post-Trial Claims of "Actual Innocence ", MD. 
B.J., Nov-Dec. 1995, at 15. 
207. Most Americans support capital punishment in some form. A Newsweek poll reported that only 
about 17% of people opposed the death penalty in illI cases. See Tom Morganthau, Condemned to Life, 
NEWSWEEK, Aug. 7, 1995, at 19, 22. 
208. See David C. Baldus et aI., Reflections on the "Inevitability" of Racial Discrimination in 
Capital Sentencing and the "Impossibility" of Its Prevention, Detection, and Correction, 5 1 WASH. & LEE 
L. REv. 359 (1994) (discussing the possibility of removing discrimination from capital jury sentencing). 
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inMcCleskey.209 McCleskey's arguments presented strong statistical evidence 
suggesting racial bias.210 Research presented to the Court by Professor David 
Baldus of the University of Iowa indicated that the chances of an African 
American receiving the death penalty increases many times over when the 
victim is white.211 These statistical disparities, although acknowledged by the 
Supreme Court, were not sufficient to lead it to invalidate the McCleskey 
sentence.212 Without contradicting the data, the majority rejected the equal 
protection arguments.213 
Ironically, two justices who were on the Supreme Court and voted 
against the racial bias claim later renounced their positions. Justice Lewis 
Powell, the author of the McCleskey opinion, told a biographer after his 
retirement from the Court that he regretted his decision in McCleskey, and he 
had "come to believe capital punishment should be abolished."214 Justice 
Powell's comments are particularly noteworthy considering that he chaired a 
federal death penalty commission that resulted in legislation designed to speed 
up executions and limit federal review.m 
Another member of the Court who altered his position on capital 
punishment was Justice Harry Blackmun who wrote in one of his final 
dissenting opinions that, "I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of 
death."216 Noting, among other things, that the penalty was hopelessly 
entangled with questions of potential racial bias, he concluded that he ''feel[s] 
morally and intellectually obligated simply to concede that the death penalty 
experiment has failed."217 He lamented that "no combination of procedural 
209. See generally Nancy J. King. Postconviction Review of Jury Discrimination:. Measuring the 
Effects of Juror Race on Jury Decisions. 92 MICH. L. REv. 63. 66 (1993) (arguing that the influence of jury 
discrimination can be measured). 
210. See generally David C. Baldus et al .• Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An Empirical 
Study of the Georgia Experience. 74J. CRIM. L. & CRiMINOLOGY 661 (1983). 
211. While unexplainable yet obvious racial disparity of jury verdicts in death penalty cases are 
examined. it is often assumed that black jurors would favor black defendants automatically. Professor 
Derrick Bell bas written that there is "a widespread assumption that blacks, unlike whites. cannot be 
objective on racial issues and will favor their own no matter what. This deep-seated belief fuels a 
continuing effort . .. to keep black people off juries in cases involving race." DERRICK BELL, FACES AT 
11IE BOTI'OMOF11IE WEll. 113 (1992). 
212. McClesky v. Kemp. 481 U.S. 279. 312-13 (1987). 
213. See id. 
214. JOHN C. JEFFRIES. JR .• JUSDCE LEWIS POWEU.. JR. AND 11IE ERA OF JUDICIAL BALANCE 451-52 
(1994). 
215. The Powell Report on Federal Habeas Corpus became the most influential document in 
Congress' effort to speed up capital punishment. Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas Corpus in Capital 
Cases. Judicial Conference of the United States Committee Report (Sept. 27. 1989). reprinted in 45 CRIM. 
L. REP. 3239.3242 (1989). 
216. Callins v. Collins. 114 S. Ct. 1127. 1130 (1994) (Blackmun. J .• dissenting). 
217. [d. 
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rules or substantive regulations ever can save the death penalty from its 
inherent constitutional deficiencies." 218 He characterized the Court's attempts 
to fairly regulate the death penalty as a "delusion.,,219 Justice Blackmun 
retired from the Court shortly after these comments.22O 
Citing the very statistics from McCleskey, Justice Blackmun noted that 
the evidence of racial prejudice wa& "staggering.,,221 The unrefuted study 
demonstrated that Blacks who killed whites were sentenced to death "at nearly 
22 times the rate of blacks who kill blacks.,,222 Other studies have reached 
similar conclusions. For example, one Louisiana study found that although 
ninety percent of all homicide victims in New Orleans are black, seventy-five 
percent of the inmates on death row are there for murdering whites.223 There 
have been calls to implement federal legislation to address the problem, and 
death penalty opponents and some clergy have called for an end to execution, 
citing the prospect of racial discrimination as a serious concern.224 
Several studies have concluded that an examination of the racial 
implications should be more closely examined.225 Governor Glendening of 
Maryland has placed funding in his executive budget to fund such a study,226 
and, like others, has suggested that the death penalty be placed on moratorium 
218. Id. 
219. Id. 
220. Justice Blackmun retired at the conclusion of the 1994 term. One insightful commentator noted 
that "Justice Blackmun correctly asserted that the death penalty has been deregulated. In recent years, the 
Supreme Court has demonstrated a willingness to completely overlook unfair procedures in death penalty 
cases." Kenneth Williams, The Deregulation of the Death Penalty, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 677, 677 
(2000). 
£'nhe Supreme Court and Congress have placed restrictions on the filing of writs of habeas 
corpus, created the harmless error rule, and established the non-retroactivity doctrine, all of 
which prevent death row inmates from obtaining relief .... (T]hrough the creation of a death 
penalty friendly doctrine and manipulation of that doctrine, or by ignoring and refusing to 
address certain important issues, such as racial discrimination in the imposition of the death 
penalty-[the Supreme Court] upholds the death penalty at all costs. 
Id. at 678. 
221. Callins, 114 S. Ct at 1135. 
222. Id. (quoting McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 327 (1987». 
223. See SISJ'ER HELEN PREJEAN, DEAD MAN WALKING 43-44 (1993). 
224. Federal legislation like the Racial Justice Act (H.R. 4017) intended to amend Title 28 of the 
United States Code to prevent racial discrimination in capital sentencing have been debated in Congress. 
225. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEATH SEN'mNCING: REsEARCH INDICATES PATIERNS OF 
RACIALDISCRlMINA nON 5 (1990) (reviewing 28 empirical studies of the death penalty, and in 82% of them 
the victim's race influenced the verdict). 
226. See Paul Schwartzman, Glendening Proposes Study of Executions; Penalty's Fairness to be 
Examined, WASH. Posr, Feb. 9, 2000, at B2 (discussing the governor setting aside $225,000 to fund the 
study of potential racial bias in the death penalty). 
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until the racial questions are resolved.227 Although further delays in the 
capital punishment process will likely anger death penalty proponents and add 
to the understandable frustration of some surviving family victims, a pause in 
actual executions seems appropriate considering the irrevocability of the 
punishment until the racial issue can be addressed.228 
Vll. THE 1990's: PAYNE AND POLITICS 
, When the Supreme Court decided that it was unconstitutional to admit 
victim impact evidence in a capital jury trial in Booth v. Maryland, 229 who 
could have known the tangled path of jurisprudence the case would spawn 
until it was finally overruled in 1991 by Payne v. Tennessee?23o Although 
litigants wanted to attack the precedent in Booth, they failed at the end of the 
1980's in Mills v. Marylancf231 and South Carolina v. Gathers,232 where the 
issue was raised within about a year after the precedent had been set.233 The 
political implications of Payne have ranged from the case being heralded by 
victims rights groups as a victory234 that restored confidence in the criminal 
justice system to being credited with hastening the retirement ofliberal Justice 
Thurgood Marshall.23S To say that the Payne decision represents the greatest 
227. The Maryland legislature recently entertained a moratorium that would have delayed all 
executions until a study could be completed to detennine if the death penalty was being imposed in a 
racially discriminatory way. See H.R. 388, 414th Reg. Sess. (Md. 2000). 
228. Under the more recent federal death penalty. the same type of racial disparity which bas occurred 
in state prosecutions bas begun to emerge. Since the federal penalty was revived in I ~88. and until 1994. 
89 percent of those on which the penalty bas been sought are either Black or Hispanic. See Kenneth J. 
Cooper. Racial Disparity Seen in U.S. Death Penalty; Execution Under 'Kingpin' Law Sought Mostly for 
Blacks, Hispanics, WASH, PoST, March 16, 1994, at AS. 
229. 482 U.S. 496 (1987). 
230. SOl U.S. 808 (1991). 
231. 486 U.S. 367 (1988). 
232. 490 U.S. 80S (1989). 
233. Interestingly, the Supreme Court granted review of the victim impact issue in Booth, Mills, and 
Gathers, but in Payne, the Supreme Court requested that the issue be briefed although it had not been raised 
by either party. The Court had also granted but later dismissed the victim impact issue in an Ohio case just 
prior to its granting the issue in Payne. See State v. Huertas, 553 N.E.2d 1058 (Ohio 1990), cert. granted, 
498 U.S. 957 (1990), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 498 U.S. 336 (1991). Thus, in the period 
between 1986-1991 the Court granted certiorari on the issue five times. 
234. Victims rights groups complained about the Supreme Court's exclusion of victim impact 
evidence from the time that opinion was announced. See generally Paul Boudreaux, Booth v. Maryland and 
the Individual Vengeance Rationale for Criminal Punishment, 80 J.CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 177 (1989). 
235. Justice Marshall announced his retirement the day Payne was decided. One writer reported that 
the decision left the Court angry and divided, and Justice Marshall bitter. See SAVAGE, supra note 17, at 
418-20. Another writer reported that during the months prior to the Payne decision the tone of the Court 
was "rancor[ousj" and that there was ''blood on the conference room floor[.]" CARL T. ROWAN, DREAM 
MAKERS, DREAM BREAKERS: THE WORLD OF JuSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 403 (1993). The staff of 
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threat to guided discretion of all Supreme Court cases since Furman is no 
exaggeration.236 The opinion raises great uncertainties about defining the 
range of persons who might be defined as victims,237 the scope of their 
potential testimony, and the degree of its emotional content.238 The case raises 
serious confrontation clause problems239 as well as strategic concerns about 
the testimony that can be challenged.240 Most importantly, considering the 
questions raised in McCleskey about weighing the value of victim's testimony 
according to race, Payne's open door policy for admitting victim impact 
evidence presents grave challenges to the prospect of guiding jury 
discretion. 241 . 
Wherever one may stand on the correctness of the decision, the frrestorm 
of controversy that was generated by the Court's radical change in precedent 
cannot be overstated.242 The decision signaled the beginning of a decade that 
. would see Congress pass a statute to speed up capital punishment signed by 
a democratic president,243 witness the Supreme Court be less willing to 
consider constitutional claims of actual innocence,244 and watch the Court 
place a procedural bar on claims raised by defendants on federal habeas 
review.24s 
Marshall's chambers were "shocked and surprised" at the announcement of his retirement, but his dissent 
in the Payne decision "reveal[edl the distance between Marshall and his colleagues." JUAN WH.LIAMS, 
THURGOOD MARSHAll., AMERICAN REVOLUflONARY 391 (1998). 
236. Cj Jose Felipe Anderson, Will the Punishment Fit the Victims? The Case for Pre-Trial 
Disclosure and the Unchaned Future of Victim Impact In/ormation in Capital Jury Sentencing, 28 
RUTGERS L.I. 367, 368 (1997). 
237. See Susan Anniece Jump, Comment, Booth v. Maryland: Admissibility of Victim Impact 
Statements During Sentencing Phase of Capital Murder Trials, 21 GA. L. REv. 1191, 1213 (1987) ("[Tlhe 
rights of defendants convicted of capital crimes cannot be sacrificed or infringed upon due to concern for 
the victims."). 
238. See Charlton T. Howard m, Note, Booth v. Maryland-- Death Knell for the Victim Impact 
Statement?,47 MD. L REv. 701, 731 (1988) ("A formalized role for the victim at sentencing, no matter 
what its specific form, detracts from the sentencing authority's focus on the defendant and imperils the very 
concept of individualized sentencing."). 
239. See Anderson, supra note 236, at408-13 (discussing the potential confrontation clause problems 
that exist with the use of victim impact evidence). 
240. See id. . 
241. See id. 
242. See generally Ranae Bartlett, Note, Payne v. Tennessee: Eviscerating the Doctrine of Stare 
Decisis in Constitutional Law Cases, 45 ARK. L. REv. 561 (1992) (maintaining that the court blatantly 
ignored precedent). 
243. President Clinton signed into law a federal bill allowing states that met certain criteria to speed 
up executions. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254, 2255, & 2266 (Supp. N 1998). 
244. See Coleman v. Thompson, 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993) (holding that actual innocence claims based 
on new evidence does Dot give rise to federal habeas relief). 
245. See Lockhart v. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct 838 (1993). 
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Although the Court did not deny all relief for capital defendants during 
the decade,246 many cases chipped away at much of the procedural protection 
that was designed to place controls and limitations on the discretion of the 
capital jury.247 
vm. DECADES OF FAILURE IN WEEKS 
The fIrst capital punishment case decided by the Supreme Court in the 
new millennium regarding jury instructions reflects the trend to provide only 
a lukewarm commitment to maintain heightened control over death penalty 
juries. In Weeks v. Angeione,248 ChiefJustice William Rehnquist held thatthe 
constitution was not violated when a trial judge directed a capital jury's 
attention to a specific paragraph of an instruction he had already given that 
addressed mitigation in response to their question seeking clarifIcation.249 
The defendant, Lonnie Weeks, Jr., was riding as a passenger from 
Washington D.C. to Richmond, Virginia.2S0 Weeks had stolen the vehicle a 
month earlier during a prior crime.251 The vehicle was being driven by his 
uncle, Lewis Dukes, and he was speeding which caught the attention of a 
Virginia State Trooper on traffic patrol named Jose Cavzos who "activated his 
emergency lights and took chase.,,252 Eventually, Dukes stopped on an exit 
ramp.2S3 Approaching the vehicle on the driver's side, the officer requested 
the driver to stand near the rear of the vehicle.2s4 He also asked Weeks to 
leave the vehicle, and as Weeks did so he fired six bullets at the trooper, two 
of which entered his body, killing the trooper within minutes.2SS Weeks was 
arrested the next morning and confessed during routine processing by a 
classifIcation officer, "indicating that he was considering suicide because he 
shot the trooper. ,,2S6 Also, Petitioner "voluntarily wrote a letter to a jail officer 
admitting the killing and expressing remorse. ,,257 
246. See McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 444 (1990) (holding that statutory requirements 
that the jury should be unanimous in finding mitigating evidence is unconstitutional). 
247. See, e.g., Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299 (1990). 
248. 120 S. Ct. 727 (2000). 
249. ld. at 729. 
250. See id. 
251. See id. 
252. ld. 
253. See id. 
254. See Weeks, 120 S. Ct. at 729. 
255. See id. 
256. ld. 
257. ld. at 729-30. 
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The jury found Weeks guilty of capital murder.2S8 In a two day penalty 
phase, the state sought to prove two aggravating circumstances.2s9 First, that 
"Weeks 'would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a 
continuing serious threat to society'" and second, that his conduct was 
"'outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman, in that it involved 
depravity of mind or aggravated battery."'260 At the penalty phase, the 
defendant presented nine witnesses and testified on his own behalf.261 During 
deliberations the jury asked a question: "Does the sentence of life 
imprisonment in the State of Virginia have the possibility of parole ... ?,,262 
The judge responded to the question in a manner reflective of the plurality 
opinion in the Supreme Court's Caldwell opinion.263 He instructed the jury 
that they should impose a punishment they felt was '~ust under the evidence, 
and within the instructions of the Court"[;] they were not to concern 
themselves with later events.264 
Later in the deliberations, the jury had another question: 
If we believe that Lonnie Weeks, Jr. is guilty of at least 1 of the 
alternatives, then is it our duty as a jury to issue the death penalty? Or 
must we decide (even though he is guilty of one of the alternatives) 
whether or not to issue the death penalty, or one of the life sentences? 
What is the Rule? Please clarify?26s 
The trial judge simply directed the jury to consider the prior instruction 
regarding mitigation.266 Two hours later, the jury returned with a verdict of 
death, concluding that one of the aggravating circumstances had been 
proven.267 Weeks' state appeal was rejected,268 and the federal district and 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected his claims.269 
Upon review, the Supreme Court found the trialjudge's conduct did not 
violate the Constitution.270 Reasoning that a '~ury is presumed to follow its 
258. See id. at 730. 
259. See id. 
260. Weeks. 120 S. Ct. at 730. 
261. See id. 
262. [d. 
263. Caldwell v. Mississippi. 472 U.S. 320 (1985). 
264. Weeks. 120 S. Ct. at 730 (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. 90). 
265. Weeks, 120 S. Ct. at 730 (quotillg App. to Pet. for Cert. 91). 
266. See Weeks. 120 S. Ct. at 730. 
267. See id. at73l. 
268. See Weeks v. Commonwealth of Virginia. 450 S.E.2d 379. 391 (Va. 1994). 
269. See Weeks v. Angelone. 176 F.3d 249 (4th Cir. 1999). 
270. See Weeks. 120 S. Ct. at 732-33. 
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instructions[,],,271 it also concluded that "a jury is presumed to understand a 
judge's answer to its question.,,272 The Court further reasoned that: 
Weeks' jury did not inform the court that after reading the relevant 
paragraph of the instruction, it still did not understand its role .... 
("Had the jury desired further information, they might, and probably 
would, have signified their desire to the court. The utmost willingness 
was manifested to gratify them, and it may fairly be presumed that 
they had nothing further to ask"). To presume otherwise would 
require reversal every time a jury inquires about a matter of 
constitutional significance, regardless of the judge's answer. 273 
The Court also relied on the poll of the jury which indicated that they had 
considered the mitigating evidence and the two hours of deliberation that the 
jury completed after the judge's question was considered "empirical factors" 
supporting its conclusion.274 
. The majority, however, acknowledged that it could not know for certain 
what transpired during those two hours of deliberations.275 It believed "the 
most likely explanation is that the jury was doing exactly what it was 
instructed to do: that is, weighing the mitigating circumstances against 'the 
aggravating circumstance that it found to ~ proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt.,,276 The Chief Justice concluded that "[alt best, petitioner has 
demonstrated only that there exists a slight possibility that the jury considered 
itself precluded from considering mitigating evidence. Such a demonstration 
is insufficient to prove a constitutional violation ... ."277 
Curiously, the opinion contains commentary on the seriousness of trial 
counsel regarding the jury instruction issue. Although making no claim that 
the issue was not properly preserved for review, the Court quipped that 
271. Id. at 733. 
272. Id. The fact that a judge makes no statement tending to sway the jurors against the defendant 
does not mean that his conduct did not influence the deliberations in other ways. "[V]erbal and nonverbal 
behavior may have important effects on trial processes and outcomes." Peter David Blanck, What 
Empirical Research Tells Us: Studying Judges' andJuries' Behavior, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 775, 777 (1991). 
His absence of explanation could convey that their question was so unimportant that it did not require a 
more detailed response. Reading them the same instruction that was given earlier would only confirm the 
confusion. 
273. Weeks, 120 S. Ct. at 733. I do not see what would be so wrong with pursuing defense counsel's 
request for additional clarification. Particularly when the question reflects an utter misunderstanding of the 
death penalty process. 
274. [d. 
275. See id. 
276. Id. at 733-34. 
277. Id. at 734. 
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counsel did not bring the issue up in an oral motion to set aside the verdict. 278 
The Court also suggested that appellate counsel had given "low priority and 
space" to the issue in his appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court, suggesting 
"that the present emphasis has some of the earmarks of an afterthought. "279 
In a dissenting opinion by Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Ginsberg; 
Breyer and in part by Justice Souter,280 he argued that the record of the case 
established "not just a 'reasonable likelihood' of jury confusion, but a virtual 
certainty that the jury did not realize that there were two distinct legal bases 
for concluding that a death sentence was not 'justified.",281 Justice Stevens 
wrote: 
Although it would have been easy to do so, the judge did not give the 
jurors a straightforward categorical answer to their simple question; 
he merely told them to re-examine the portion of the' instructions that 
they, in effect, had already said they did not understand. The text of 
their question indicates that they believed that they had a duty "to 
issue the death penalty" if they believed that "Weeks is guilty of at 
least 1 of the altematives."282 
Justice Stevens reasoned that, "[w]ithout a simple, clear cut statement from 
the judge that the belief was incorrect, there was surely a reasonable 
likelihood that they would act on that belief. ,,283 
Justice Stevens was also very critical of the majority's analytical 
approach to the case, particularly its reliance on the presumption . of 
correctness of jury instructions. 
Instead of accepting a commonsense interpretation of the colloquy 
between the j ury and the judge, the Court first relies on a presumption 
that the jury understood the instruction (a presumption surely rebutted 
by the question itself), and then presumes that the jury must have 
understood the judge's answer because it did not repeat its question 
after re-reading the relevant paragraph, and continued to deliberate for 
another two hours. But if the jurors found it necessary to ask the 
judge what that paragraph meant in the first place, why should we 
278. See id. 
279. Weeks, 120 S. Ct. at 734. 
280. See id. Ironically, some of the family members of the slain officer did not want to see Weeks 
executed. See Brooke A. Masters, Daughter Seeks Mercyfor Father's Killer; Woman Talks to Condemned 
Man, WASH. PoST, March 10,2000, at B1. 
281. Weeks, 120 S. Ct. at 735. 
282. ld. at 737. 
283. ld. 
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presume that they would find it any less ambiguous just because the 
judge told them to read it again?284 
Justice Stevens reasoned that by the majority's "logic, a rather exceptionally 
,assertive jury would have to question the judge at least twice and maybe more 
on precisely the same topic before one could find it no more than 'reasonably 
. likely' that the jury was·confused.,,285 
The problems that are evidenced in the Supreme Court's Weeks opinion 
make clear that the Court has not provided adequate supervision to capital 
juries.286 Rather, its jurisprudence has permitted them to deliberate in sheer 
confusion of the complex statutory duty placed upon them. When a jury asks 
for reinstruction, that does not reflect mere lack of understanding, but rather 
a consensus that they cannot continue their constitutional duty until further 
explanation is offered.287 To simply provide the same instruction previously 
given over the objection of defense counsel should be considered 
presumptively unreasonable.28s This is because it is likely that any 
misunderstanding will be amplified by failure to clarify the instructions. Like 
the somewhat analogous situation of urging jurors to reach a verdict, it 
encourages those who might be inclined to grant life to be discouraged that 
their efforts to hold out are improper and unlawful. The logic of the Supreme 
Court in Caldwel(2s9 and Mills290 should be followed in order to enable the 
judge to err on the side of permitting jurors to make findings that would 
284. Id. at 737 (citation omitted). 
285. Id. at 738. 
286. One study examining the questions asked by the capitaljury in the Weeks case inquired whethe~ 
jurors are capable of understanding instructions, and it reached the following conclusion: "When the 
members of a capital sentencing jury say they don't understand a critical instruction, shouldn't the judge 
be required to answer them with something more than a directive to go back and read the same instruction 
one more timeT Stephen P. Garvey et aI., Correcting Deadly Confusion: Responding to Jury Inquiries 
in Capital Cases, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 627, 628 (2000). The failure to carefully guide the jury in an area 
where they expressed a specific concern would have a potentially lethal result. ''Consequently, if the Weeks 
jurors had understood that the law never requires death, a unanimous verdict in death's favor would, we 
think, have been unlikely." Id. at 643. 
287. To make inquiry of the judge is the clearest indication of misunderstanding. It is clear that the 
jurors may well have concluded that the trial judge did not take their lack of understanding seriously by 
simply repeating his earlier charge. At the same time, the judge may have placed too much confidence in 
the jury's ability to understand and thus "discount[ed] signs that. .. [the] jury ... [was] having real trouble 
understanding what ... [was] going on[.]" Nancy J. King, Why Should We Care How Judges View Civil 
Juries?, 48 DEPAUL L. REv. 419, 420 (1998). 
288. It is presumptively unreasonable to assume jurors figured out their earlier concerns without 
assistance when a life hangs in the balance. On March 16, 2000, Lonnie Weeks was executed by lethal 
injection. See Trooper's Killer Executed in Virginia; Officer Was Slain During Stop on 1-95, WASH. PoST, 
March 17, 2000, at B2. 
289. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985). 
290. Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988). 
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support a life rather than a death sentence.291 What a tragedy for our 
jurisprudence to place citizen jurors in a position where they have regret that 
because of unclear instructions they felt compelled to execute a man when 
they intended to explore deliberation discussions that may have led to a 
different result. 292 The criminal justice system would not be greatly burdened 
by affording full clarity to jurors who wish to fully seek understanding of the 
role mitigation plays in deciding a capital case.293 
The Weeks opinion turns the notion of guided discretion contemplated by 
the drafters of the Model Penal Code on its head.294 Rather than taking 
extreme care to insure that all benefit of the doubt move in favor of guided 
discretion, the Weeks opinion presents a neutral attitude toward the value of 
jury control and guided discretion.29s Jurors start the death penalty process 
unsure of what is expected of them. There are generally no instructions about 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances until the penalty phase of the case 
concludes. Under these circumstances, clear guidance after a request for 
clarification is the only sensible rule. Perhaps states could draft procedural 
rules that would require judges to give clearer instructions when jurors have 
indicated any confusion whatsoever.296 
291. See William S. Geimer, Death at Any Cost: A Critique of the Supreme Court's Recent Retreat 
From Its Death Penalty Standards, 12 FLA. ST. U. 1.. REv. 737, 738 (1985) (discussing the need for "super 
Due Process" in the administration of the death penalty). 
292. It should be remembered that even a single juror can change a death penalty verdict. 
293. Some courts have given little regard to the role of mitigation and the clear explanation of that 
principle to the sentencing jury. See Clozza v. Murray, 913 F.2d 1092 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 
U.S. 913 (1991) (maintaining that counsel was not ineffective in failing to offer jury instructions regarding 
mitigation of the sentence). 
294. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (1980) with Weeks v. Angelone, 120 S. Ct. 727 (2000). 
295. One commentator described the attitude of the Rehnquist Court toward capital punishment in 
this way: 
Iustice William Rehnquist has transformed habeas corpus into a thicket of obscure and time 
consuming procedures that prevent federal judges from correcting constitutional errors 
unless they cast serious doubts on the defendants guilt. Rehnquist's innovations, most of 
them spun out of thin air, represent his most radical vision: an abandonment of the ideal of 
a fair trial in favor of a cruder search for something near the truth. 
Ieffery Rosen, Bad Noose, The Non-Rescue of Habeas Corpus, NEW REPUBUC, October 4, 1993, at 14. 
296. "Without an itemized instruction, the average jury may be unable to extrapolate from the mass 
of mitigating evidence presented the mitigating circumstances thaI, in the defense's view, provide 
independent and sufficient grounds for rejecting the death penalty." Shelley Clarke, Note, A Reasoned 
Moral Response: Rethinking Texas's Capital Sentencing Statute After Penry v. Lynaugh, 69 TEX. REv. 
407,435 n.142 (1990) (quoting Randy Hertz & Robert Weisberg, In Mitigation of the Penalty of Death: 
Lockett v. Ohio and the Capital Defendant's Right to Consideration of Mitigating Circumstances, 69 
CALIF. 1.. REv. 317, 346 (1981». 
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The concerns raised in Furman and later structured into statutory life in 
the Gregg trilogy of cases297 are totally lost if the very people who are 
deciding the case do not understand the very basics of their task. 298 Court 
decisions that place too many technical barriers to full consideration of death 
dependant factors, particularly mitigation, should be considered fundamentally 
unfair. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
The national experience with capital punishment has been characterized 
as the struggle of states to retain the punishment while being subjected to a 
system of constitutional scrutiny. 299 When the Supreme Court in Furman first 
brought the full breadth of procedural concerns together to advise the States 
of the constitutional concerns, developing adequate procedures became the 
priority in order to continue to have the option of executions in the States' 
criminal justice arsenal.300 Recognizing that controllingjriror discretion would 
be a continuing concern, the Supreme Court began fashioning a jurisprudence 
which attempted to recognize the reality that jurors cannot be trusted with all 
the infonnation or be left without guidance about information which has been 
determined relevant to its decision.30t 
The jurisprudence of the last two decades has been characterized as a 
loose commitment to controlling capital juries, permitting trial courts a great 
deal of flexibility in treating capital jury instructions and the introduction of 
evidence, as if the jurors were deciding a typical criminal case.302 This was 
never what Furman contemplated, and certainly not what the drafters of the 
297. See Hertz & Weisburg, supra note 296, at 345-46 (stating that the Gregg trilogy of 1976 
recognized that ''jury instructions are an indispensable device for ensuring that the jury understands and 
considers the legal effect of the evidence"). 
298. "It is of vital importance ... that any decision to impose the death sentence be, and appear to 
be, based on reason rather than caprice or emotion." Gardner v. florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977). 
299. Although the death penalty is popular in America, "[a] II of West em Europe, Canada, Australia, 
New Zealand, most of Latin America, and even some former Communist nations of Eastem Europe have 
abolished it." JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN '\lIE COURTS 456 (1994). 
300. See generally SUSAN JACOBY, Wn.o JUSTICE: THE EVOLUTION OF REVENGE 242-43 (1983) 
(explaining that Furman invalidated capital punishment, but it was rejuvenated in part due to public support 
of re-writing death penalty statutes). 
301. Prejudice that may be generated by the emotional impact of the testimony during a jury trial led 
one American Bar Association Report to suggest that jury consultants be used in capital cases to help 
determine "what invisible but lethal [amounts] ... of prejudice may exist in the jury pool[.]" AMERICAN 
BAR ASSOCtAl1C)N, supra note 163, at 117. 
302. See, e.g., Weeks v. Angelone, 120 S. Ct. 727 (2000). More significantly "the court's decision 
suggests that trial judges have minimal obligations to clarify instructions for jurors who are confounded by 
the legal language in a tough capital case." 'Joan Biskupic, Death Penalty o/Trooper's Killer Upheld, 
WASH. PoST, Jan. 20, 2000, at A 7. 
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Model Penal Code anticipated.303 The lack of protection in the capital 
sentencing process has been particularly troublesome when one examines the 
unabated discriminatory effect of capital punishment in the post Furman 
era.304 The less controls that exist on jury discretion, the more likely 
unconscious racism will enter into the death penalty calculus.3OS 
Maybe the only way to establish once and for all that the death penalty 
is hopelessly entangled with racial discrimination is to have two juries of 
twelve hear the case, one who is presented with victim impact evidence and 
one who is not, when the victim and defendant are of different races.306 A 
verdict for life from either jury would be sufficient to avoid a death verdict. 
This would require that both juries receive separate closing arguments and 
separate deliberations.307 Jurors who are exposed to victim impact testimony 
will likely more often give death. Although this would not necessarily be due 
to racial discrimination, the factor of victim impact would be demonstrated to 
be the primary factor in cases when both juries do not agree. 
Such results would isolate the factor of race in a way that would make it 
difficult to ignore.308 In some ways, this approach may be criticized because 
303. Perhaps the well thought out structure and safeguards contemplated by the drafters of the Model 
Penal Code began to erode from the problem ofttying to preserve a penalty that required such a complex 
design to make it comply with due process. Thus. 
[tjhe years since Furman have been marked by persistent state efforts to achieve two 
seemingly inconsistent objectives. and by the Court's encouragement of them in that 
contradictory quest. The ends are jury disCretion unimpeded by too much judicial oversight 
in imposing the death penalty. and avoidance of the appearance of arbitrariness. 
WJUlAM M. WIECEK. LmERTY UNDER LAW: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN LIFE 171 (1988). 
304. The longstanding discrimination in the criminal justice system. in general. no doubt effects the 
racial disparity in capital punishment. In his classic work on race in America. Gunnar Myrdal noted that 
statistics and results in the criminal courts are affected by discrimination in application of the criminal law. 
See GUNNARMYRDALET AL •• AN AMERICAN DIl£MMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY 
966-76 (1962). 
305. One observer of the death penalty process bas commented that unguided and absolute discretion 
makes each juror subject to his "prejudices and his subconscious for the keys to decision." MICHAEL 
MaTSNER. supra note 59. at 69 (quoting Brief of Berll. Bernhard, et. al.. as amicus curiae. Maxwell v. 
Bishop, 398 U.S. 262 (1970) (No. 13». 
306. I envision that this process would occur at the election of the defendant. It would not be a 
mandatory procedure, since strategic considerations may warrant a lawyer waiving the second jury. 
307. Jury instructions need to be revised and tested before they should be used in the death penalty 
process. See Shari Seidman Diamond & Judith N. Levi,lmproving DecisiollS on Death by Revising and 
Testing Jury IllStructiollS, 79 JUDICATURE 224. 232 (1996). 
308. There have been some suggestions that racial disparity in the death penalty can be resolved by 
executing more murderers of blacks. This suggestion advanced by Professor Randall Kennedy is 
characterized by what is called a "level up solution." See RANDAll KENNEDY. RACE. CRIME. AND THE LA w 
344 (1997). While Professor Kennedy bas written insightfully on the topic of racial discrimination and 
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it might be thought to violate equal protection since it establishes a 
classification based on race.309 However, the statistical phenomenon that 
demonstrates racial disparity has been so "staggering,,310 that it may well meet 
the test for strict scrutiny required to establish racial classifications.311 
Furthermore, as long as cross racial defendants are treated the same and 
defendants and victims of the same race are treated the same, there may be no 
equal protection violation for such a procedure. 312 
Another legitimate concern may be whether the expense of seating two 
capital juries during a case would make such an approach feasible.313 First of 
all, two juries sitting at the same time is not unknown to the American 
criminal process.314 Although there would be an increase of time to select two 
juries, considering the import of deciding who should live or die, the cost of 
additional jurors must be considered a secondary matter.31S Perhaps after 
several years of death penalty verdicts where victim impact evidence is denied 
to one jury deciding the defendant's fate, we may be ready to admit that a 
capital punishment on other occasions, I cannot agree with the "level up" solution. As I have already 
argued, the death penalty has flaws beyond racial discrimination. I cannot understand how executing more 
people under an arbitrarily regulated death penalty system can serve a valid curative purpose. 
It is tragic that a possible explanation of the racial disparity in the death penalty may well be explained 
because jurors, judges, and prosecutors generally under value the lives of Black penple. However, under 
no circumstances should the remedy for unfair executions for one group be to increase such executions for 
all. 
309. The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause provides that no state shall deny "any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § J. 
310. Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1135 (1994). 
311. Indeed, strict scrutiny might be established by the unexplained but Iroubling and consistent 
racial disparity regarding black defendants that murder white victims. 
312. So long as all cross racial murder defendants are given the opportunity for two juries whether 
they be white or black, equal protection problems might be avoided. Thus, a white defendant who killed 
a black victim will also get the benefit of a second jury without victim impact testimony from the black 
victim's family. 
313. The issue of the cost of capital punishment has always factored into decisions about how much 
protection a defendant is entitled. "Death penalty cases are much more expensive than other criminal cases 
and cost more than imprisonment for life with no possibility of parole." Richard C. Dieter, MILLIONS 
MISSPENT: WHAT PounCIANS DoN'T SAY ADour THE HIGH COSTS OF 1lIE DEATH fENALTY, in nm 
DEATII PENALTY IN AMERICA: CURRENT CONTROVERSIES, supra note 112, at 401, 402. 
314. Procedures where two juries are used during the trial of a criminal case are not unheard of in 
either federal or state court. See United States v. Lebron-Gonzalez, 816 F.2d 823. 831 (1st Cir. 1987) 
(noting that there is no abuse of discretion for a murder trial to involve five defendants and empanel two 
juries). See also United States v. Hayes. 676 F.2d 1359.1366-67 (11th Cir. 1982) (explaining that use of 
a dual panel as an alternative to severance appealed to the appellate court). 
315. Added voir dire and caJling additional jurors is a minor inconvenience considering the high 
stakes of an execution. For a detailed account of potential changes in the jury system. see Kelso. supra note 
186. at 1433-1592. 
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victim driven capital punishment scheme which leads to chronic racial 
disparity should be abandoned.316 
In the meantime, the best way to protect capital cases from being treated 
like any routine criminal trial is to adopt higher standards of control over 
capital jury instructions.317 Requests for reinstruction should be interpreted 
as jury misunderstanding and should be addressed as a serious matter, not 
merely by offering the same instruction again.318 The scientific data on jury 
behavior, particularly the research that has been conducted since the Furman 
decision, indicates that we should exercise more rather than less control over 
capital juries.319 
There also needs to be more research on the use and influence of various 
jury forms and verdict sheets.32o Many jury reform plans have contemplated 
what should be done with sending written instructions into jury 
deliberations.321 Traditionally, even written instructions were not permitted 
316. The victim impact controversy goes to the philosophical core of the role of the Supreme Court 
and the delicate balance between the rights of the accused and those who would severely limit their 
protection. 
In a memorandum written by one of Justice Thurgood Marshall's law clerks while the issue was to be 
considered by the Supreme Court illustrates the point. The memo urged Justice Marshall to "[flight like hell 
on this one[,]" because "[Marshall's1 prior rejection of retribution as a justification for the penalty, plus the 
risk of arbitrary results, should make this a close case legally and morally for the right wingers." BENOI 
MEMORANDUM 1'0 JUsnCE MARSHAll. in re Booth v. Maryland at 7, March 24, 1987 (reproduced from 
the Thurgood Marshall Papers, Collections of the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress). 
317. The Supreme Court has recognized that "the qualitative difference of death from all other 
punishments requires a correspondingly greater degree of scrutiny of the capital sentencing determination." 
California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998·99 (1983). 
318. See Weeks v. Angelone, 120 S. Ct. 727,735 (2000)(Stevens,J., dissenting). One commentator 
feared that the decision in Weeks would leave jurors confused. Professor Paul Marcus said that "jurors get 
so little guidance. To say judges have no requirement to assist them will simply lead to greater 
misunderstandings, particularly in death penalty cases[.]" Biskupic, supra note 302, at A7. 
319. One commentator has insightfuUy noted that "the Court continues to rely on intuitive 
assumptions of juror infallibility. The enormity of the capital sentencing decision mandates a more critical 
scrutiny of jury instructions, including juror comprehension. . .. Empirical research, contradicting the 
Courts assumptions, indicates that jurors do not fully comprehend their instructions." Susie Cho, 
Comment, Capital Confusion: The Effect 0/ Jury Instructions on the Decision to Impose Death, 85 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMiNOLOGY 532, 561 (1994). 
320. Some have argued that a written record of findings in death penalty cases is importimt. See 
Samuel H. Pillsbury, Emotional Justice: Moralizing the Passions o/Criminal Punishment, 74 CORNELL 
L. REv, 655, 698·710 (1989). 
321. Some studies have suggested that written instructions do not matter. See Written Pretrial 
Instructions Needed by Jury, Study Says, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 3, 1983. at 43. (reporting study of researchers 
who concluded that juries that receive no instructions at all make about the same number of 
misinterpretations of the law). 
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for the jury because they have sometimes been viewed as having too much 
influence over the deliberations.322 
The Supreme Court has demonstrated a reluctance to control the 
discretion of capital juries in a way that would guard against any possible 
error in the understanding of their task. This is a disappointment considering 
our history of an arbitrary and discriminatory death penalty. Perhaps the 
Court, in its zeal to retain the penalty because of its popularity, has given too 
much control to juries by not exercising every presumption that the death 
sentence is neither expected or preferred, thus losing cite of the objective that 
the penalty should be available only to a narrow class of murders.323 
Once juries are free to consider death it may well be that the late Justice 
Blackmun was correct when he pondered whether the system had simply 
reduced the number of people subject to an arbitrary penalty. 324 At the center 
of the debate stands the trial by jury which serves as a buffer to the death 
penalty when it is appropriately controlled. Since the death penalty will likely 
continue to be used, dignity, due process, and fundamental fairness require 
that we mortar its walls of procedural protection with sterner stuff.32S 
322. Some researchers have expressed considerable doubt about whether juries obey written 
instructions at all. It has been noted that "American juries, bound by formally mandatory instructions, 
undoubtedly disregard these instructions more than occasionally[, and] ... calling judicial instructions 
mandatory or advisory does not determine how often the instructions are followed." Alben W. Alschuler 
& AndrewG. Deiss, A Brief History of the CriminalJuryin the United States, 61 U. CHI. L REv. 867,914 
(1994). 
[d. 
Undisputed procedures--the general verdict, the principle of non-coersion of jurors, and the 
inability to direct verdicts of conviction--ensured both nineteenth- and twentieth-century 
American juries the practical power to "acquit against instructions." The general verdict 
and the principle of non-coercion of jurors frequently ensured the power to "convict against 
instructions" as well. 
323. Some scholars have vigorously argued that the irrevocability of capital punishment "should be 
subject to strict scrutiny."'See Margaret Jane Radin, The Jurisprudence of Death: Evolving Standardsfor 
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 126 U. PA. L REv. 989,1029-30 (1978). 
324. See Callins v. Collins, 114 S. O. 1127,1134 (1994). 
325. See generally Ezekiel, supra note \, at 13: 12. 
